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## Deliverable No. 2.2

# Public report on describing and comparing the dimension, characteristics and dynamics of youth migrants in European countries

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- PU: Public, fully open, e.g. web
- CO: Confidential, restricted under conditions set out in the Model Grant Agreement
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# 1 Introduction

*Monica Roman (ASE) and Vera Messing (CEU)*

The purpose of this report is to describe the dimension, characteristics and dynamics of youth migration to Europe, to provide an overall perspective on the socio-economic integration of young migrants and to explain the populations' perceptions on migrants. This report is part of the MIMY project, supported through Grant Agreement no. 870700 by the HORIZON 2020 EU program between 2020 and 2023, and covering nine countries. The consortium countries (CCs) are Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom, and they receive a specific attention in the current research. A quantitative methodology is employed, relying on descriptive and comparative analysis, using macro and micro secondary data.

The overall objective of MIMY is to investigate the integration processes of young migrants (aged between 18 and 29) and minors (15-17) who are third country nationals (TCNs) at risk and who find themselves in vulnerable conditions. The main aim of MIMY is to focus on the integration processes of young migrants and to understand their daily intercultural relations with the local population, which leads to the main research question: *How to support the liquid integration processes of young migrants in vulnerable conditions in Europe to increase social and economic benefits of and for migrants?*

Therefore, MIMY adopts a multilevel approach which interlinks macro-, meso- and micro-level components for understanding liquid integration processes of young migrants in vulnerable conditions in a temporal perspective.

The current report responds to this multilevel approach by considering two levels of analysis: the macro-level regards the national dimension of youth migration and the integration of young migrants in the receiving countries; the micro-level analysis goes deeper and provides a more specific perspective, by analysing individual level data on (1) attitudes towards immigrants in host societies and (2) determinants of immigrant youth's vulnerability. The two dimensions are reflected in the balanced structure of the report. Due to the limited availability of the secondary statistical data on migrants in vulnerable conditions at regional and local level, the meso level approach was not covered by our quantitative analysis, being however considered in other working packages of the MIMY project.

In this report the young migrants are regarded as the group of *TCNs aged between 18 and 29 years old and residing in the European countries; when data allow it, also several sub-groups are analysed, as the most vulnerable among the individuals in vulnerable conditions: refugees, unaccompanied minors and stateless, thus following the general MIMY research strategy*. This is also in line with the EU approach on vulnerability of migrants, which *"stems from various factors at the individual level, such as their age, gender, disabilities or health status, plus the experiences that they left behind in their country of origin or encountered during their travel"*<sup>3</sup>. MIMY sees vulnerability *"from the perspective of the young migrants and not from a pre-defined perspective"*. Vulnerabilities can also be present through challenges regarding citizenship, political participation, health, education, housing, social welfare, gender, sexuality, ethnic group, access to the labour market, single parenthood, risk of poverty, etc. These dimensions are not tackled by macroeconomic data that are generally describing mass phenomena, specific for large populations of individuals. Therefore, the analysis in this report is restricted to the secondary data available at macro and micro-level, as indicated below, and covers the features most common across TCNs. However, it is worth mentioning that more sensitive issues of vulnerability remain to be tracked in the qualitative strand of the MIMY project.

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<sup>3</sup> *Sustainable inclusion of migrants into society and labour market*, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/sustainable-inclusion-of-migrants-into-society-and-labour-market>

The report uses macro data available (mostly) in Eurostat databases, as well as micro-data (at individual level) retrieved from the European Social Survey. A macro-level dataset to describe the European picture of the migrants in vulnerable conditions has been produced in the MIMY project (as Deliverable D2.1<sup>4</sup>) providing coherent and comprehensive information on the situation of migrants in vulnerable conditions in Europe. The data were collected and compiled from three types of data sources: (i) international and European data providers for macro data, mainly Eurostat, (ii) in the case of the nine consortium countries, primary data was requested at a national level from the authorities managing migration, (iii) individual level (micro) data from the European Social Survey for developing indicators about natives' attitudes towards immigrants. The macro data set D2.1 consists of 76 indicators further subdivided into 432 different variables, included in 14 worksheets in a single Excel file. **It covers a core period of 10 years (2010-2019) and 29 countries: EU27 (2020), Norway, and the United Kingdom.**

It also considers four dimensions of migrants' integration developed based on the EU strategies in the field. They focus on (1) labour market integration, (2) education, (3) social inclusion and (4) housing conditions and health. Declaration of Zaragoza<sup>5</sup> (2010) was the first EU document<sup>6</sup> that established the four main dimensions of migrants' integration, as well as the indicators that allows for assessing the integration level of the TCNs and the progress made in this respect. The four dimensions of integration are employment, education, social inclusion (health included) and active citizenship, and these inspired the set of the indicators used (also accessible in the D2.1) and the structure of the analysis of the current report. Moreover, the most recent EU documents, such as *Sustainable inclusion of migrants into society and labour market*<sup>7</sup>, published by the EU in June 2019, stress that "Labour market inclusion is one of the key areas addressed by EU policies; it is fundamental to becoming part of the host country's economic and social life", while migrants' participation to education and their integration into the education system are key factors for labour market inclusion. Such policy documents are also convergent with the academic approach, as the seminal paper of Ager and Strang (2008). The first (basic) domain of integration, Makers and Means, includes Employment, Health, and Housing.

In a comprehensive research setting, the same four dimensions of integration are employed in the micro-level analysis. The central hypothesis in this case is that vulnerable position of young immigrants occurs concerning opportunities of integration on various dimensions of social life. The micro-level analysis uses individual level data on immigrant youth from the nine European Social Survey's rounds. The countries covered by the ESS are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia. Therefore, only five out of the nine consortium countries are covered by this analysis.

Following the purpose of the D2.2 to describing the dimensions, trend and integration of the young migrants in vulnerable conditions in European countries, the report is structured into five chapters. The first one describes the magnitude of the number and flows of migrants, providing a perspective on the dimensions and dynamics of the main groups of interest. It also provides an assessment of the availability and accessibility of statistical data in CCs, based on the information provided by Consortium Partners.

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<sup>4</sup> Roman, M., Cimpoeru, S., Manafi, I. & Prada, E. (2020) : MIMY D2.1 Macro-data inventory. Internal document.

<sup>5</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/declaration-of-the-european-ministerial-conference-on-integration-zaragoza-15-16-april-2010>

<sup>6</sup> Prior to that, a number of documents discussed the integration of TCNs, such as *The EU's 11th Common Basic Principle on Immigrant Integration policy* (2004). This one states that developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.

<sup>7</sup> Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&furtherPubs=yes&pubId=8230&langId=en&>

The second chapter looks at the integration of non-EU nationals in the European societies, following the four dimensions of integration: labour, education, social inclusion, and health.

The third chapter aims at describing the vulnerable youth in Europe, by looking at the multiple dimensions of individual integration, as revealed by the micro-data analysis. In this section we show the most important elements that are related to the vulnerable condition of immigrant youth in comparison with non-immigrants.

The fourth chapter, also using individual (micro-) level data, focuses on TCN immigrants below the age of 30 and presents the main factors that are likely to increase the chances of living in vulnerable conditions.

The final chapter presents mainstream society's attitudes towards immigrants. Using individual level data, we show how attitudes have changed during the past 18 years in MIMY partner countries and we identify most important elements of anti or pro-immigrant attitudes across Europe. The report ends with an overall conclusion.

## 2 Dimension and dynamics of youth migration in Europe

*Ioana Manafi and Monica Roman (ASE)*

To uphold answering the key question of the MIMY project, “How can the liquid integration processes of young migrants in vulnerable conditions be supported, increase social and economic benefits of and for migrants in Europe<sup>8</sup>?” in this section we provide a descriptive analysis of the most important young immigration flows and stocks, also related to stateless and unknown citizenship, unaccompanied minors, acquisition of citizenship, naturalization rate and long-term residence permits.

Vulnerability is a foundational element of the human rights framework. The vulnerable conditions that migrants face can arise from different factors that may coexist at a certain moment, as being unable to enjoy the human rights, being at an increased risk of violations and abuse. The vulnerable conditions may be due to factors that makes migrants to leave their origin countries, may occur during their journey and/or at destination.<sup>9</sup>

To provide a characterization of migrants in vulnerable conditions, we have considered in the macro-level analysis the young non-EU immigrants and more precisely the Third Country Nationals (TCNs). Where possible we have concentrated our analysis on young migrants, but where there was a significant lack of data by age-groups (as in the long-time residence permits and stateless and unknown citizenship cases) we have characterized the data on the total population.

### 2.1 An overview of total immigration stock by origin and destination country

Using data provided by the United Nations<sup>10</sup> we firstly describe the immigrant outflows from the countries considered to be the most vulnerable according to their human development index (HDI).

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<sup>8</sup> The destination countries we have considered EU28 (before Brexit) plus Switzerland and Norway

<sup>9</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Principles and practical guidance on the protection of the human rights of migrants in vulnerable situations, 24 February 2017, A/HRC/34/31, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/58b010f34.html> [accessed 24 October 2020]

<sup>10</sup> The main data source for this section is accessible at: <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp>

Migrants from countries with low or medium HDI are more exposed to be in vulnerable conditions. People displaced by insecurity and conflict face special difficulties away from home.

In total, 17186921 immigrants from these countries with low and medium HDI were estimated to live in the EU28 countries plus Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway.

The highest share of the immigrants from countries with low and medium HDI was registered in the United Kingdom (22%), followed by France (16%), Italy (12.3%), Germany (12.1%), and Spain (10%). The lowest share is found in Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia, Iceland, Latvia, Poland, Malta and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, Finland, Czechia, and Greece with less than 1%. A large share (almost 40%) of the United Kingdom's immigrants are from India (23.7%) and Pakistan (15.6%). 2.699.927 immigrants are living in France. The highest share from them is from Maroc (37.7%), followed by immigrants from Vietnam (5.1%).

It is estimated that in Italy in 2019 were living more than 2.1 million immigrants whose countries of origin were with low or medium HDI. The majority came from Maroc (21.3%), China (10.7%), Republic of Moldova (8.9%), India (7.6%), Bangladesh (7.2%), Egypt (5.7%), and Pakistan (5.3%). More than 2 million immigrants from countries with low or medium human development index are living in Germany: 28% are from Syria, 9.9% are from Afghanistan, 9% are from Iraq, 5.6% are from China, 4.9% are from Vietnam, and 4.2% are from India. In 2019 in Spain were living 1.76 million immigrants coming from countries with low and medium development indexes. Moroccans have the highest share with more than 40%, followed by immigrants from the Dominican Republic (9.4%), Chinese (9.3%), and Bolivians (8.5%).

The largest diaspora in EU28 (and Norway and Switzerland) consists of Moroccans (over 2.77 million, 88.8% from the total diaspora, representing 16.1% of total immigrants from the countries considered in the study), followed by Indians (1.47 million, 8.4%, 8.6%), Chinese (1.14 million, 10.6%, 6.6%), Syrians (1.05 million, 12.8%, 6.1%). Immigrants from the Republic of Moldova, the only origin country from Europe considered in the study are on the ninth position (0.47 million, 47%, 2.7%).

Network analysis is employed for producing an overall picture of the international migration movements; this method relies on precise data on the migrants' stocks from the specific countries of origin to all destination countries. The variable that is analysed is the total migrant stock at mid-year<sup>11</sup> by the origin and by major area, region, country, or area of destination for 2019. We have considered the destinations to be CCs. As origin, we have selected countries with low or medium HDI<sup>12</sup>, according to the classification used by Eurostat based on the UN HDI. We are looking at the TCNs originating from countries with low or medium HDI, as are more likely to be in vulnerable conditions compared to migrants from countries with high HDI or to natives. In the end, we have selected 94 origin countries that may be identified in the Figure 2.1.

The network analysis was employed using Gephi software and the results are presented in the standard graphical manner in Figure 2.1 below.

In the centre of Figure 2.1, there are the receiving countries that are most connected<sup>13</sup> with the origin countries. Therefore, if for a country the number of connections is high, there is more diversity among its immigrants. In the heart of the graphic lie destination countries like Italy (immigrants from 92 countries are living in), Sweden (91), and UK (90). In the close vicinity of these countries, we can find countries less connected, like Germany (60), Hungary (70), and Norway (77). The least connected countries are Luxembourg (18), Romania (21), and Poland (42). The most connected origin countries

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<sup>12</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/migr\\_acqn\\_esms\\_an3.PNG](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/migr_acqn_esms_an3.PNG)

<sup>13</sup> The most connected country is considered to be the destination country in which immigrants from more origin countries are living in.



## 2.2 Immigration flows of young people by age groups


The following sections of this chapter describe the migrants' groups that are under the lens of the MIMY project: young migrants, asylum seekers, stateless or unaccompanied minors, mainly using the Eurostat data.

Looking firstly at young TCN migrants (15-29 years old), the data show that during the analysed period (2010-2018), the top five destination countries for youth immigration<sup>14</sup> were Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

The trends observed between 2010 and 2018 show a dynamic pattern. In 2010, the highest share of **youth aged 15-19** in total immigration was in Cyprus (13%), followed by Hungary (9%) and Spain (7.5%), and the lowest was registered in Poland (2.7%) and Estonia (3%). The situation is completely different in 2018, when the highest share was in France (9.5%) and Sweden (9%), followed by the Netherlands (8.5%). The lowest shares were registered in the Eastern European countries. In 2018, the highest number of young males aged 15-19 years old was registered in Germany (61517), followed by Spain (44922) and France (36757), while in 2010 the highest number was in Italy (29236) and Spain (27251). The largest share of young migrants was reported in the **20-24 years** group. In 2010, Denmark (22.5%) registered the highest share, followed by France (22.18%) and Hungary (20.65%), while in 2018 the shares were lower overall, but Denmark, and Cyprus maintained them. When comparing absolute numbers, Germany (137619) registered again the highest number of immigrants, followed by Spain (79349) and France (70291).

In 2010, the highest share of young people **aged 25-29** in the total immigrants' flow was registered in Poland (28.48%), followed by Czechia (22.29%) and Denmark (21.70%). As in the previous case, the shares were considerably lower in 2018. Iceland (22.62%) registered the highest share, followed by Cyprus (21.53%). Still in 2018, Germany (141955) had the highest flow of immigrants, followed by Spain (97213).

Comparing the consortium countries (Figure 2.2), Germany is a clear outlier as it has received the highest number of young immigrants. In 2015, in the context of the ongoing Syrian crisis, immigration flows peaked in Germany, as well as in other countries, such as Poland or Hungary. In Sweden, the peak was recorded in 2016 and in Italy a year later, after the closure of the Balkan route. However, the magnitude of the inflows in these countries is much lower compared to Germany, Romania being the country that has reported the lowest number of young immigrants.



<sup>14</sup> **Immigration represent** the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country. (Eurostat – metadata)

Figure 2.2. Youth (15-29 years old) immigration flow for consortium countries, 2010-2018<sup>15</sup>

Source of data: EUROSTAT, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR\\_IMM8](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_IMM8).

## 2.3 Asylum and first-time asylum applicants

A (first-time) asylum applicant is a third-country national or a stateless person who has applied for international protection (for the first time) or who has been included in such an application as a family member during the reference period. The asylum applicant seeks for a refugee status or subsidiary protection status, and does not explicitly request another kind of protection, outside the scope of Directive 2011/95/EU (Recast Qualification Directive)<sup>16</sup>. Also, from a legal and statistical perspective, the applications submitted by persons who are subsequently found to be subject of the Dublin Procedure (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013) are included in the number of asylum applications. Persons who are transferred to another Member State in the application of the Dublin Regulation are also reported as asylum applicants in the Member State where they are transferred to.

Since 2010 the total number of asylum applications increased to more than double in the EU28 countries, with a peak in 2015 and 2016, when the number of applications increased almost five times. In 2015, more than half of them registered in Germany. In Italy, as well as in Romania, the peak was reached only in 2017. Some countries have important shares of the total application as Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. A special case is Hungary, a country found on the Syrian refugees' path. In 2010 only 2095 applications for asylum were registered there, but in 2015 the number increased 84,55 times, reaching a peak of 177 135 applications.

Regarding the first-time asylum applicants, the trend is similar as in the previous case: in 2016, Germany had the highest share of first-time asylum applicants of all considered countries (with almost 60%).

Looking at the consortium countries (Figure 2.3), it is worth mentioning that in Hungary, almost 98% of the total extra EU applications of asylum were first-time applications. More than half of the first-time applications were made by young persons aged 18-34<sup>17</sup> and almost 10% by youth in the 14-17 age range. It is also important to notice that in most of the countries there are more male applicants than females in all considered age groups. During 2013-2015, Sweden hosted the greatest share of the stateless asylum applicants aged 18-34, as well as less than 18 years old, followed by Germany and the Netherlands. At the EU28 level, more than double of the applicants were males.

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<sup>15</sup> Except for Luxembourg, Romania, United Kingdom because of the lack of data on age groups

<sup>16</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/glossary\\_search/application-international-protection\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/application-international-protection_en)

<sup>17</sup> The age group provided by Eurostat data was 18-34




Figure 2.3. Young asylum applicants, Consortium countries. 2010-2018.

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

## 2.4 Asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors

An unaccompanied minor represents a non-EU national or stateless person below the age of 18 arriving on the territory of the EU States being unaccompanied by an adult responsible for him/her, and for as long as s/he is not effectively taken into the care of such a person, including a minor who is left unaccompanied after s/he has entered the territory of the EU States (Asylum acquis, e.g. Qualification Directive)<sup>18</sup>.

Unaccompanied minors come to the EU for a variety of reasons: to escape from wars and conflicts, due to poverty or discrimination, in search for a better life, as victims of human beings trafficking etc. (Ahsan Ullah, 2018). They become an important part of migration in multiple vulnerable conditions.

In 2009, 11455 unaccompanied minors (9160 males and 2280 females) from non-EU countries applied for asylum in one of the considered countries (except for Croatia). Comparing the shares of the total unaccompanied minors registered in the considered countries, the highest ones were registered in Sweden (20.91%), followed by Germany (17%) and the United Kingdom (14.97%), while the lowest in Eastern European Countries, but also in Spain, Malta and Portugal. The number of asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors increased yearly until 2014, when it increased almost 9 times in comparison with 2009. CCs are among the top recipients of unaccompanied minors: Sweden hosted almost 34%, Germany 21.67%, Hungary 8.5%, Austria 8%. The gender gap is still present: almost 90% are males and 10% females. In 2015, the unaccompanied

<sup>18</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:337:0009:0026:EN:PDF>

minors applying for asylum decreased, but Germany hosted more than half of them, followed by Italy (9.1%) and Austria (almost 6%). None was registered in Lithuania, Slovakia, and Estonia. The number continued to decrease and in 2018 only 18300 were found (15670 males and 2 620 females).

Stateless unaccompanied minors are a category facing multiple vulnerabilities, due to their young age, but also to the lack of a family and a citizenship (Urgessa et al, 2020). In 2014, the number of total stateless unaccompanied minors increased by more than 17 times compared to 2009, reaching a peak of 1405 (1130 males and 275 females). Sweden scored the highest (39.7%), followed by the Netherlands (15.6%) and Hungary (11.7%). Starting with 2015, the number of stateless asylum applicants in Europe decreased substantially, reaching only 120. 80 of them were registered in Norway and Sweden (40 each).

## 2.5 Stateless persons and migrants with unknown citizenship

In the first article of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the definition of the stateless person introduces ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’ (Robinson, 1955). Such individuals have no citizenship and are unprotected by national legislation. The consequences are profound, as these persons are left vulnerable in many aspects of their life: they cannot work legally, own property, open a bank account, or, in some cases, attend a school, get married, register births, deaths or even vote. Hence, stateless people have to face multiple challenges in destination countries.

When analysing vulnerable groups in the context of the refugee crisis, a major problem the EU is facing is related to the large numbers of children who were born during the journey made by their parents from the countries of origin or residence to the EU. Many of these children do not have birth certificates or travel documents. Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Slovenia confirmed that they cannot issue a birth certificate in this case<sup>19</sup>.

The number of stateless persons in the world is difficult to estimate, but in 2016 UNHCR<sup>20</sup> estimated that 10 million people were stateless. Statelessness may arise also where parents are stateless, but also in some countries where citizenship is not granted automatically at birth (see Table 1).

Table 1. Provisions for citizenship for children born in the State who would otherwise be stateless, January 2020

Automatic at birth	Only if parents are stateless or of unknown citizenship	Requires parental years of residence or status	Requires child's years of residence	No provisions
Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain	Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Slovenia	Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania	Austria, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Malta, Sweden, United Kingdom	Cyprus, Romania

Source: [www.statelessness.eu](http://www.statelessness.eu)

The situation of the “unknown citizenship” may also arise when persons are not citizens of the reporting country, nor of any other country, but have established links to the reporting country,

<sup>19</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/00\\_eu\\_inform\\_statelessness\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/00_eu_inform_statelessness_en.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-highest-decades.html>

which include some but not all of the rights and obligations of full citizenship. This category consists mainly of former Soviet citizens living in the Baltic States who have not applied for the citizenship of their current country of usual residence. More than 370000 people lack a nationality in Estonia and Latvia. As a unique situation in international practice, Latvia has introduced the term «a non-citizen of Latvia» applying to Soviet era residents of Latvia whom the local legislations recognise as legitimate residents but on whose civil and political rights they nevertheless impose serious restrictions<sup>21</sup>.

In 2013, the countries considered in the analysis sheltered 6501 stateless persons and 5106 persons with unknown citizenship. 2106 stateless persons were between 15 and 29 years old and 1676<sup>22</sup> of unknown citizenship. In 2018, there were 1 617 stateless persons and 7195 persons of unknown citizenship. The highest share of stateless people was in Germany (39.5%), followed by the Netherlands (15.4%), Denmark (10.3%), Austria (8.9%), and Sweden (8.4%).

From the consortium countries, Germany, Sweden, and Norway are sheltering important shares of stateless people. The United Kingdom has no stateless persons, nor did Romania in 2018. The other countries from the consortium have less than 100 stateless persons per year and in some cases (Luxembourg and Hungary) less than 10.




Figure 2.4. Stateless persons in the consortium countries Germany, Sweden, and Norway, 2013-2018.

*Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data*

In 2017, Romania received the highest share of the people with unknown citizenship (34.27%), followed by Germany (30.86%) and the Netherlands (10.45%). In 2018, the 8768 persons with unknown citizenship were distributed across the considered countries as follows: the highest shares were found in Germany (43.86%), Ireland (14.71%), the Netherlands (10.65%), and Finland (10.65%).

Between 2013 and 2018, Italy and the United Kingdom sheltered no people with unknown citizenship, while Luxembourg and Hungary, as well as Norway, had few people with unknown citizenship. Also, starting with 2017, Poland had no individuals with unknown citizenship.

<sup>21</sup> New Immigrants in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, Tallinn, 2010

<sup>22</sup> There were missing data for Austria, Romania, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Malta, Greece, Ireland,

## 2.6 Steps to integration: the acquisition of citizenship and naturalization rate

In the European Union, international migration is still a leading factor of population growth. Also, TCNs, refugees, or unaccompanied minors face a greater risk of social exclusion than the native population. The integration of these groups in the host countries is desired, but it should be regarded as a multidimensional process. All steps from legal and political integration to cultural integration, and going through socio-economic inclusion, are important. In the next sub-sections, we present an overview of the acquisition of citizenship and long-term permits and the naturalization rate for young TCNs, as initial steps to integration. This section regards the overall group of migrants and not solely the young immigrants.

### 2.6.1 The acquisition of citizenship

The aim of the **Zaragoza Declaration** (April 2010) is to comparably monitor the immigrants among EU countries. For this purpose, four areas of integration were considered as priority areas and the naturalization rate was one of the main indicators considered. In order to calculate the naturalization rate it is important to know the acquisition of citizenship, which represents the number of grants of citizenship of the reporting country to persons usually resident in the reporting country who have previously been citizens of another country or who have been stateless (Eurostat)<sup>23</sup>.

In 2013<sup>24</sup>, there were 1027432 acquisitions of citizenship over the considered countries, of which almost 47.7% were males and 52.3% females. More than 87% of the total acquisitions of citizenship were from non-EU countries. The distribution of gender is quite similar when speaking about the acquisitions of citizenship for non-EU citizens (approximately 48% males and 52% females). 5% of the non-EU acquisitions of citizenships were aged between 15 and 19 years, 3% were aged between 20 and 24, and 5% were aged between 25 and 29.

In 2013, the share of the TCN's acquisition of citizenship in the total acquisition of citizenship varied between 18.6% in Luxembourg or 20.1% in Hungary and 98.8% in Estonia. Except for Hungary, the Eastern European countries and former Soviet Countries registered the highest shares (see figure 2.5 for CCs).

222312 non-EU citizens acquired Spanish citizenship in 2013, representing 25% of the total immigrants in the considered countries, followed by the British (21%), French, German, and Italian citizenships (with approximately 10% each).

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<sup>23</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/eu-zaragoza-integration-indicators-italy>

<sup>24</sup> data in this section are available only for 2013-2018




Figure 2.5. The TCN's acquisition of citizenship in the Consortium Countries, 2013-2018

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

The total acquisitions of citizenship dropped from 1027432 in 2013 to 882743 in 2018 (a drop of more than 14%) and the TCN's acquisitions of citizenship from 900854 in 2013 to 684186 in 2018 (a drop of more than 24%). The highest drop between 2013 and 2018 was registered in Ireland (in 2018): more than 80% for the TCN's acquisitions of citizenship. In 2017, Spain registered a drop of more than 60%, followed by Hungary (2017, drop of 58%) and Greece (2015, drop of 53%). In 2016, the acquisition of citizenship in the considered countries was on the rise. The main contribution to the increase came from Denmark (9.15 increase year-over) and Malta in 2017 (7.1 increase y/o). In Germany, during 2013 and 2018, the TCN's acquisitions of citizenship dropped by 8%, in Spain by 60%, while in France and Italy they increased by 12% and 10% respectively.

In 2018, only 77.5% of the total acquisitions of citizenship were of TCN citizens. The distribution on gender was similar to the one in 2013 (47.7% males and 52.3% females for the total immigrants and 48.8% males and 51.2% females for the non-EU citizens). The United Kingdom ranked first with 106,263 non-EU citizens acquiring citizenship, representing 16% of the total non-EU acquisition of citizenship in 2013, followed by Italy (15%), France (14%), Spain (13%), and Germany (12%).

The highest numbers of **stateless immigrants** acquiring a citizenship were registered in Sweden (5629 persons in 2018, 7072 persons in 2017, 4395 persons in 2016, 3264 persons in 2015), followed by the Netherlands (2380 persons in 2018). There are many countries which have not registered any stateless acquisition of citizenship like Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Finland.

In 2013, France registered the highest number (2365 persons) of the acquisitions of citizenship by the people with unknown citizenship, followed by Sweden (1589 persons in 2018), the Netherlands (1529 persons in 2014), and the United Kingdom (1196 persons in 2018). Spain, Italy, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Norway registered none.

During 2013-2018, Eastern European Countries (except Slovakia) registered the smallest rate of acquisition of citizenship by non-EU citizens from countries with very high development rates.

The opposite was registered in Malta (21.2) and Cyprus (22.7) in 2013. Overall relatively high rates were registered in Slovakia (20% in 2018, 18% in 2015 and 16% in 2016).

When considering the rate of acquisition of citizenships by non-EU citizens from countries with medium development rate in the total acquisition of citizenship by non-EU citizens, the highest can be found in Iceland (around 60%), followed by Sweden (over 58% in 2013, 48% in 2014, 46% in 2018) and Spain (over 50%). The smallest rates were found in Eastern European countries (usually smaller than 10% during 2013-2018).

UK, Norway, and Sweden are among the countries that register low rates in naturalizing citizens with very low HDI.

### 2.6.2 The naturalisation rates

**The naturalisation rate** is the ratio of the number of persons who acquired the citizenship of a country during a calendar year over the stock of foreign residents in the same country at the beginning of the year. The 'naturalisation rate' should be used with caution because the numerator includes all modes of acquisitions and not just naturalisations of eligible residing foreigners, while the denominator includes all foreigners and not the relevant population, i.e. those foreigners who are eligible for naturalisation.

The conditions to be fulfilled vary a lot at country level. Under Article 24 of the recast Qualification Directive, Member States are required to issue to beneficiaries of international protection a residence permit with a minimal duration of 3 years for refugees. The central prerequisite for applying for nationality is a minimum period of residence in the country of refuge<sup>25</sup>. The minimum required residence period for refugees varies from none (France) to 10 years (Malta and Switzerland). Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Ireland are among countries requiring 3 years of residence.

In 2018, the naturalization rate was 2.0 % across the EU-27 members, scoring 0.1% lower than in the previous year. This rate was slightly higher for females (2.1%) than for males (1.9%). During 2009-2018, the naturalisation rate for non-EU citizens, stateless, and people with unknown citizenship ranged between 2.0 % and 2.7 %. A peak was registered in 2016, when an increase occurred due to (in part at least) the increasing number of citizenships granted in Spain that year (the number of acquired citizenship increased from 94 100 in 2012 to 225 800 in 2013). The lowest rate was registered in 2018, as the naturalisation rate dropped from 2.1 % (in 2017) to 2.0 % (in 2018).

In 2018, the naturalisation rate for non-EU citizens (including stateless and unknown citizenship) was 2.7% in the EU-27 (excluding Cyprus and Malta), while the same rate for EU citizens was only 0.7%. In the same year, Romania (10.5%), Sweden (8.1%), and Portugal (6.7%) recorded the first three positions for naturalization rate for non-EU citizens, while Denmark, Czechia, and the Baltic States registered below 1%.

For CCs the highest naturalization rates were registered in Romania and Sweden and the lowest were registered in Hungary and Germany (see Figure 2.6).

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.asylumineurope.org/comparator/protection>




Figure 2.6. The naturalization rate for all Non-EU citizens in CCs, 2018

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

The younger the people, the higher the naturalization rates that were recorded (for children aged 10-14, the rate was 4.8%, followed by children aged 15-19 years old with approximately 3.9%). The gender gap in favour of women is present in general for all age groups and years<sup>26</sup>.

### 2.6.3 The acquisition of long-term residence permits

In the same context, it is worth mentioning that many migrants take the first step towards integration by obtaining a **long-term resident permit**. A long-term resident does not hold a citizenship of the host country, but, instead, has resided legally and continuously within the territory of the host country for more than five years and fulfils certain requirements, accordingly to Directive 2003/109/EC<sup>27</sup>. There are some national variations in the requirements for and benefits of long-term resident status. In 2018, in the EU considered countries (excluding Denmark), there were 10.5 million non-EU citizens holding long term residency rights, representing approximately 53.5% of all non-EU citizens. Latvia (90.7%) is the leading country, followed by Estonia (84.8%), France (71.8%), and Italy (64.7%). At the opposite, we can find Finland (0.8%) and Ireland (0.9%), followed by Malta (4.9%), Poland (17.3), and the Netherlands (24.3%). The situation has considerably improved at the EU-27 level since 2014 (the rate increasing from 41.2% in 2014 to 53.3% in 2018). The highest increase was registered in Bulgaria from 2.5% in 2014 to 63.1% in 2018, while the highest decrease was registered in Norway from 80.51% in 2014 to 50.1% in 2018.

In 2018, in CCs, the highest shares of all non-EU citizens holding residence permits were registered in Sweden (67.3), followed by Italy (64.7), while the lowest shares were registered in Romania (22.4) and Poland (17.3) (see Figure 2.7).

<sup>26</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant\\_integration\\_statistics\\_-\\_active\\_citizenship&oldid=287229#Naturalisation\\_rate](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_active_citizenship&oldid=287229#Naturalisation_rate)

<sup>27</sup> ["Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents". Council of the European Union. 25 November 2003](#)




Figure 2.7. **Share of all Non- EU citizens holding residence permits (%) in 2018**<sup>28</sup>

Data Source: Eurostat data, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Non-EU\\_citizens\\_with\\_long-term\\_residence,\\_2014-2018\\_v3.png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Non-EU_citizens_with_long-term_residence,_2014-2018_v3.png)

## 2.7. Availability of the statistical data regarding migrants in vulnerable conditions in the nine consortium countries

This section assesses the availability and accessibility of statistical data referring to the characteristics of the young migrants in vulnerable conditions: refugees, asylum seekers, stateless and unaccompanied minors in the CCs. The previous sections proved that numerous international institutions provide valuable information on the number of migrants. The main European data provider, Eurostat, as well as the UN, provide free public access to aggregated data concerning the annual dimensions of stocks and flows of migrant groups. However, for better understanding these groups and for developing effective policy measures, specific data for describing the main characteristics of the vulnerable migrants would be needed. We have selected the most relevant features analysing the integration in the host societies, for describing the demographic characteristics of migrants (age, gender, and marital status, duration of stay, country of origin), their reasons of migration, education level, labour market status and housing. As noticed, these variables are partly covered with data concerning overall migrants from inside or outside the EU; however, they are not available for migrants in vulnerable conditions. In an attempt to assess the availability of such detailed data, specific data requests were made by the MIMY partners in the CCs to the most relevant national data providers and institutions. The following analysis provides a unique, updated assessment of the statistical data availability and accessibility regarding the dimensions and characteristics of the four migrants groups in vulnerable conditions. Our analysis describes the situation in the nine CCs and may be also used for obtaining an understanding on the European context.

<sup>28</sup> No available data for UK.

### 2.7.1 Germany

In Germany there are three institutions dealing with statistical data regarding migrants in vulnerable conditions:

- BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) operates the Central Register of Foreigners (AZR), which includes about 20 million personalized data sets. Most statistical studies about migration issues in Germany refer to data from AZR. However, the data itself is highly protected and thus not available for public access. Only institutions that are authorized by national or federal authorities are legitimated to request and process data from AZR. Available data is not differentiated into age groups, which restricts the analysis to overall migrants. The research branch of BAMF has started an annual survey amongst refugees (and their families) who arrived in Germany between January 2013 and December 2016. The survey covers up to 5,700 refugees and also considers different age groups. It seems that the data resulted from the survey are not accessible to the research community.
- DESTATIS (Federal Statistical Office) provides data sets on migrants with different residential status, but only on aggregate level for all migrants and not related to different age groups. The report on „Migration and Integration: Integration indicators 2005-2017“ (2019) considers different age groups, but not different residential statuses: here, the aggregate level is „third-country foreigners“ or „with migration background“.
- The Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Agency) has published statistical data on „persons in the context of forced migration“ („Personen im Kontext von Fluchtmigration“). This group does not necessarily consist of refugees according to the Geneva Convention, but, in general, of persons with a recognized protection status such as asylum seekers or resettlement refugees. So, the group is slightly broader than in other statistics. Some of the latest data for 2019 and 2020 have been published with focus on different age groups (15-25 and 25-35 years).

To sum up, in Germany data are not collected on a systematic manner and starting with 2013 they are complemented through specific surveys. However, data are hardly accessible to the research community. The received data show that the origin countries of the asylum seekers entering Germany were rather stable between 2010 and 2018; in 2018 these were: Syria (173140), Afghanistan (88475), Iraq (54365), Eritrea (34225), Somalia (18500), Iran (14515); Turkey (11460); Nigeria (11205). Syria is also the main country of origin in the case of refugees.

### 2.7.2 Hungary

In Hungary data are mainly accessible through the National Statistics Institute. Generally, they cover the same variables that are also provided by Eurostat. Also, the Office of Immigration and Nationality and UNHCR provide valuable information on dimensions of the stocks and flows of asylum seekers and refugees. The evidence confirm that in 2015 Hungary had a peak of asylum seekers (177135 persons<sup>29</sup>) and refugees (mainly males aged 18-34). The top countries of origin were Syria and Afghanistan (for more than half of the asylum seekers). Also, more detailed information regarding the marital status shows that in 2019 65% of the refugees were single, 31% were married, 2% were widowed and 2% divorced.

### 2.7.3 Italy

Data on Asylum seekers and refugees are provided in Italy by the following institutions:

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<sup>29</sup> Office of Immigration and Nationality  
([http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid=1232&lang=hu](http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid=1232&lang=hu))

- Ministry of the Interior (Ufficio Centrale di Statistica/Statistical Central Office): The Section “Immigration and Asylum” makes public tables<sup>30</sup> containing data from 2016 to 2018: data on flows related to asylum requests (total male and female; total disaggregated by age groups but not by gender) and flow data related to outcomes of asylum requests (total outcomes, outcomes disaggregated by gender/age/country of provenience). Before 2015, the data was accessible through Annual reports concerning flow data about asylum requests in Europe and in Italy. Also, the Ministry of the Interior<sup>31</sup> has only the data made available by the Office in charge of the matter and published in the “Yearbook of Official Statistics of the Interior Administration”. These data regard the number of applicants and number of “outcomes” of applications per year; furthermore, the distinctions by gender and age classes are provided separately and without the possibility of crossing. No information is collected on the Duration of stay, Reason of migration, Education, Marital status, Housing.
- Another potential data provider may be the National Commission for the right of asylum (Commissione Nazionale per il diritto di asilo), which provides information of flows dimensions, gender and age, country of origin.

Besides the dimensions of the flows and stocks provided, the *Statistical Central Office* also provided the main countries of origin for the asylum seekers. In 2010, these were: Nigeria (1190), Pakistan (670), Afghanistan (645), Iraq (275); in 2019, the ranking was slightly different: Pakistan (6485), Nigeria (2380), Bangladesh (1850), El Salvador (1335), Afghanistan (1251), summing up to 13560 individuals. In the case of the refugees, the ranking was: Nigeria (22319), Pakistan (18249), Afghanistan (16491), Mali (15000), and Somalia (13373).

The main potential data on UAMs is SIM<sup>32</sup> (Sistema informativo nazionale dei minori stranieri non accompagnati/ National information system for unaccompanied foreign minors under the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies) which is the national body responsible for unaccompanied foreign minors who are not applying for international protection. The reports produced by this institution contain information about flows, age, gender, geographical distribution in Italy, country of origin, accommodation (private/reception facilities/untraceable). Italian data about UAMs are fragmented and are collected by different authorities based on their competencies for specific population groups:

- UAMs who did not apply for international protection (Ministry of Labour and Social Policies-SIM);
- UAMs who are applying for international protection (Protection system for Asylum seekers and refugees, Ministry of the Interior).

Also, the number of unaccompanied minors shows high values after 2015: 17373 in 2016, 18303 in 2017, 10787 in 2018 and 6054 in 2020.

Information about **stateless** people is scarce, being provided by the National Statistics Institute through their website<sup>33</sup>. Also, the estimates provided by civil society organizations, stateless persons in Italy would be between 3000 and 15000<sup>34</sup>. Only a few hundred have today received the legal status of “stateless” from the Italian state. Most of the stateless people residing in Italy are of Roma ethnic origin, coming mostly from former Yugoslavian countries.

<sup>30</sup> [http://ucs.interno.gov.it/ucs/contenuti/Dati\\_relativi\\_ai\\_richiedenti\\_asilo\\_int\\_00029-7744756.htm](http://ucs.interno.gov.it/ucs/contenuti/Dati_relativi_ai_richiedenti_asilo_int_00029-7744756.htm)

<sup>31</sup> Information provided by the representatives on 11 May 2020 via email [statistica@interno.it](mailto:statistica@interno.it)

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/immigrazione/focus-on/minori-stranieri/Pagine/Dati-minori-stranieri-non-accompagnati.aspx>

<sup>33</sup> [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it)

<sup>34</sup> (<https://www.unhcr.it/risorse/carta-di-roma/fact-checking/chi-e-un> -(<https://www.unhcr.it/risorse/carta-di-roma/fact-checking/chi-e-un-apolide>).

### 2.7.4 Luxembourg

In Luxembourg, Staterc (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg)<sup>35</sup> produces data on general migration flows and stocks. The Directorate of Immigration of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs publishes a governmental annual report on migration<sup>36</sup>. In the successive annual reports from 2010 to 2019, data were retrieved regarding the following variables: international protection requests (flows, total numbers, not disaggregated); asylums granted (flows, total numbers, not disaggregated); subsidiary protection granted (flows, total numbers, not disaggregated); asylum seekers' country of origin; refugees (flows, total numbers, not disaggregated); refugees' country of origin; unaccompanied minors (for the years 2012 to 2014 and 2016 to 2019, and disaggregated by sex); unaccompanied minors' country of origin (from 2017 to 2019). The European Migration Network (EMN) – through the National Contact Point Luxembourg – also provides data through its reports<sup>37</sup>.

### 2.7.5 Norway

The sources used to find Norwegian data about asylum seekers, stateless migrants and unaccompanied minors are Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB) and Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI). Both these data sources are publicly accessible and data are available online.

- Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB)<sup>38</sup> is the national statistical institute of Norway and is a subordinate agency of the Department of Finance, being the main producer of official statistics in Norway. SSB is responsible for collecting and producing statistics related to population, economy, immigration, and other aspects of society, both at national, regional, and local levels. However, SSB only publishes statistics of people with legal residence in Norway. Statistics of asylum seekers that have applied to stay in Norway but are waiting to have their application processed are not included in the SSB database, while UDI is the main provider of such statistics.
- Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI)<sup>39</sup> is responsible for processing applications from foreigners who want to visit or live in Norway. UDI is also responsible for running reception centers for asylum seekers, and handle deportations. Statistics, research, and developmental reports about migration to Norway are also provided by UDI.

The data provided by these institutions confirm that Norway receives the largest share of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. The main countries of origin are Syria, Turkey, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Somalia. In 2015, the year with the highest share of immigrants, the main sending countries of asylum seekers to Norway were Syria (7869), Eritrea (2129), Afghanistan (2665), Iraq (2221), Iran (1055). Eritrea was the first country of origin in 2016 and 2017, while Syria was the first for the rest of the years, including 2015 (the record-year in terms of number of immigrants).

In Norway, the number of stateless migrants decreased significantly after the peak registered in 2015 (1204 people): in 2019 there were 129 individuals registered as stateless. The gender profile shows that, in general, female have a lower proportion than males (46% in 2019), while 35% were minors. The main reasons for migrating, in the case of stateless individuals are: family (48.72%), refugee (30.77%), work (9,4%) and education (8,55%). Between 2013 and 2017, being a war refugee was the first reason for migrating.

### 2.7.6 Poland

There are three main sources of statistical data on the **four target groups** identified as being migrants in vulnerable conditions in the WP2 (asylum seekers, refugees, stateless persons and unaccompanied minors): The Office for Foreigners (Urząd ds Cudzoziemców), Statistics Poland

<sup>35</sup> Web link : <https://statistiques.public.lu/en/index.html>

<sup>36</sup> Web link: <https://maee.gouvernement.lu/en/le-ministere/rapports-annuels.html>

<sup>37</sup> Web link: <https://www.emnluxembourg.lu/>

<sup>38</sup> Webpage: <https://www.ssb.no>

<sup>39</sup> Webpage: <https://www.udi.no/statistikk-og-analyse/>

(Główny Urząd Statystyczny), and Border Guard (Straż graniczna). Of these three sources, the Office for Foreigners has the most comprehensive and detailed data, easily accessible through the website<sup>40</sup>. In this database there are only data regarding age, sex and country of origin. Moreover, the Office for Foreigners **does not collect** data on family situation, education, employment/earnings and accommodation of the four groups of interest. Office for Foreigners reports the data to Statistics Poland, so these two institutions provide the same data. Also, data is collected by the Border Guard, which is receiving applications for international protection upon arrival to the country (land or airport) and then passes the data to The Office for Foreigners. With reference to the **stateless persons**, Halina Nieć, Legal Aid Center (NGO), who collaborates with European Network on Statelessness highlights the problem of the data collection, resulting from the fact that Poland has not signed the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons nor the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

Regarding the **UAM (unaccompanied minors)** another potential data source is the Department for Social Assistance of the Office for Foreigners, however it is not clear if they collect the data of interest. Currently the information available regards the flows and country of origin. In 2019 the main country of origin of the UAMs is Russia, followed by Ukraine, Afghanistan and Syria.

Summing up, the most relevant data source was The Office for Foreigners (Urząd ds Cudzoziemców) and their database is accessible online. Other Polish institutions provide the same information, however aggregated in less accessible manner. It seems like the data on family situation, education, employment/earnings and accommodation are not collected or accessible at national level.

### 2.7.7 Romania

In Romania, foreign citizens have the right to apply for asylum and receive protection from the Romanian state (by granting refugee status), if their application is substantiated. The institution responsible for taking over and analysing the asylum application is the General Inspectorate for Immigration - Asylum and Integration Directorate (IGI-DAI), which is also the main data provider to Eurostat or to various stakeholders. During the asylum procedure at administrative level, the designated institution, IGI-DAI, collects most of the data in two phases: the questionnaire initially applied followed by a detailed interview.

The collected data include: Name/Surname; Date of birth; Country of origin; How the country was entered; Route travelled; Level of education. Most of these data are part of a database (SIMS), except for those related to route and education, which are not included in this database and are kept in physical format in the asylum file. For this reason, no statistical data can be processed electronically or compiled on these segments.

In the case of those with refugee status, IGI-DAI collects data through interviews so as to establish the individualized integration program, but these are similar to those collected during the asylum procedure. Therefore, IGI-DAI cannot release statistical data based on criteria such as education, level of work experience, qualification etc. At the same time, the pieces of information introduced by IGI-DAI and the responsible institutions in other fields (social protection, education, employment etc.) are not interconnected and correlated.

In the case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum or refugees, the Authority for Child Protection carries out a social inquiry with the aim of establishing an action plan. The data collected are relatively complex and include issues related to health, education, financial situation, but they are not aggregated into a database. Instead, they remain written in the beneficiary's file, being confidential and not accessible for statistical purposes.

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<sup>40</sup> The site [www.migracje.gov.pl](http://www.migracje.gov.pl) led by Office for Foreigners provide more detailed information.

In the field of access to *health services*, the data collection has some peculiarities. Persons with international protection can be insured in the public health system, based on Law no. 95/2006 on health care reform. When they enter the health system, either by payment on their own account or by other means provided by law, the Health Insurance House collects the data on refugees in the category called "Foreign nationals". As a result, extracting and interpreting data on the number and manner of refugee insurance in Romania is impossible.

The *labour market* integration is managed by the Employment Agency. In the case of refugees wishing to access the integration program and the non-reimbursable financial aid, the registration as a jobseeker with the Employment Agencies (AOFM) is mandatory. The data collected by this institution, in addition to identification data, are: the level of education, the level of qualification and if, subsequently, the person was recommended a job through AOFM.

To conclude, IGI provides the main values of the flows and stock of migrants in vulnerable conditions in Romania, accessible directly from the Eurostat database. A large amount of information is collected by other institutions, however the data are not in a digital format, but kept on paper.

### 2.7.8 Sweden

Two institutions act as main data providers in the Swedish case: the Migration Agency and Statistics Sweden. The database STATIV<sup>41</sup> from Statistics Sweden is accessible by the research communities. MONA (Microdata Online Access) is Statistics Sweden's standard tool for delivering microdata<sup>42</sup>. The database includes data from 2007 to 2017. The reason for migration is reported based on the legal reasons for residence (for example, which protection status).

Swedish data on foreign born are based on registers over persons with residence permits. Because asylum seekers are not included in the registered population, there is less information about them. For example, they are not included in the STATIV database.

### 2.7.9 The United Kingdom

The main data provider on migration statistics in the UK is the UK Home Office. Of the variables across the four target groups – refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless migrants and unaccompanied minors - just four are publicly available in the UK: stocks and flows for asylum seekers and refugees. The same indicators are provided by the Eurostat (see Chapter 2 of this report). More detailed data may be accessible, however, the UK Home Office seems reluctant in releasing such data to the research community.

### 2.7.10 Discussion

A common trend emerges after analysing the situation of the statistical data accessibility and availability in the nine CCs: the statistical information across the four target groups – refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless migrants and unaccompanied minors – is available, in all the nine countries; the values for the annual stocks and flows are publicly accessible. The same indicators are provided by Eurostat, as the main European data provider (see Sections 2.2-2.6 in the current report). Also, the countries of migrants' origin are reported in all the analysed countries.

Evidence shows that the data on family situation, education, employment/earnings and accommodation are not collected in a systematic manner at national level in all of the nine CCs. For overcoming this data shortages, Germany runs partial data collection through surveys.

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<sup>41</sup> [https://scb.se/contentassets/659b9a5233dc4dd49b22630b2745ca57/informationsfolder-stativ-eng\\_mars2018.pdf](https://scb.se/contentassets/659b9a5233dc4dd49b22630b2745ca57/informationsfolder-stativ-eng_mars2018.pdf).

<sup>42</sup> <https://scb.se/en/services/guidance-for-researchers-and-universities/mona--a-system-for-delivering-microdata/>

In many of the countries (Germany, Romania, Italy, Poland) various data for the same migrant category are collected by a number of institutions, and in general, there is no coordination between these institutions for aggregating the available information.

Norway seems to be the country best covered with data, also providing information on the reasons for migration, however not disaggregated by age.

Even when the information is available, such as in the case of Romania, it is not collected in a digital form, but on paper. In other cases, such as the UK or Hungary, even if the information is available at national statistical offices, it is not easily accessible to the researchers. Therefore, aggregating data for statistical purposes is practically not feasible.

Finally, the table below provides a synthesis of the data availability in the nine CCs that may be considered a starting point for understanding the broader European context in this matter.

Table 2.2. Statistical data availability in the nine CCs on the migrants in vulnerable conditions

Migrant Group in vulnerable conditions	Variable	Germany	Hungary	Italy	Luxembourg
Refugees	Flows and stocks on age groups	Stocks, total age	Stocks (period 2011-2018)	Flows on age groups; Stocks on total age	-Flows on total age
	Sex	No	Stocks (period 2011-2018)	Flows	No
	Country of origin	Yes, only for 2016 (18-30 years)	Yes (2011-2017)	Only total age	Only total age
	Duration of stay	No	No	No	No
	Reason for migrating	No	No	No	No
	Education	Yes, only for 2019, total age	No	No	No
	Marital Status	No	Yes (2011-2018)	No	No
	Labour market status	Yes for 2016, 2019 (15-35 years)	No	No	No
	Income	No	No	No	No
	Housing	No	No	No	No
Asylum seekers	Flows and stocks on age groups	Yes	Flows (18-34 years)	Flows on age groups; Stocks on total age	Only total age
	Sex (flows, stocks)	Yes	Flows (18-34 years)	Flows	No
	Country of origin	Yes	Yes	Yes (18-34 Years)	Only total age
	Duration of stay	No	No	No	No
	Reason for migrating	No	No	No	No
	Education	No	No	No	No
	Marital Status	No	No	No	No
	Labour market status	No	No	No	No
	Income	No	No	No	No
Housing	No	No	No	No	
Stateless	Stocks on age groups	Yes	Zero stateless persons reported	Only total age	No
	Sex	Yes	-Zero stateless persons reported	Only total age	No
	Country of origin	No	No	No	No
	Duration of stay	No	No	No	No
	Reason for migrating	No	No	No	No
Unaccompanied minors	Stocks on age groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (2012 – 2019)
	Sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (2012 – 2019)
	Country of origin	No	Yes	Yes (2012-2019)	Yes, 2017 - 2019
	Reason for migrating	No	No	No	No

Migrant Group in vulnerable conditions	Variable	Norway	Poland	Romania	Sweden	UK
Refugees	Age groups (flows, stocks)	Yes, flows	Yes, S + F	Yes (18-34Y)	Yes, S + F (2014 - 2017)	Yes, Flows
	Sex	No	Yes, S + F	Yes (18-34Y)	Yes, S + F (2014 - 2017)	Yes, Flows
	Country of origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, 2014, 2016, 2017	No
	Duration of stay	only total age	No	No	Yes, 2014 - 2017	No
	Reason for migrating	No	No	No	No	No
	Education	No	No	only weights (OIM)	Yes, 2014, 2015, 2017	No
	Marital Status	No	No	only weights (OIM)	Yes, 2014 - 2017	No
	Labour market status	No	No	partial, weights (OIM)	Yes, 2014 - 2017	No
	Income	No	No	No	Yes, 2014 - 2017	No
	Housing	only total age	No	partial (OIM)	Yes, 2014 - 2017	No
Asylum seekers	Age groups (flows, stocks)	Yes, Stocks (2014 - 2019)	Yes, flows	Yes (18-34Y)	Yes, S + F	Yes, S + F (estimates for Stocks)
	Sex (flows, stocks)	Yes, Stocks (2014 - 2019)	Yes, flows	Yes (18-34Y)	Yes, S + F	Yes, S + F (estimates for Stocks)
	Country of origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Duration of stay	No	No	No	Waiting times (2017 - 2019)	No
	Reason for migrating	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Education	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Marital Status	No	No	No	No	No
	Labour market status	Yes, partial	No	No	Yes, partial	No
	Income	only total age	No	No	No	No
	Housing	No	No	No	yes	No
Stateless	Age groups	Yes (2014 - 2019)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Sex	Yes (2014 - 2019)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Country of origin	No	No	No	No	No
	Duration of stay	No	No	No	No	No
	Reason for migrating	only total age	No	No	No	No
Unaccompanied minors	Age groups	Yes, total (No age groups)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Sex	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Country of origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Reason for migrating	Yes	No	No	No	No

Source: authors' elaboration based on the information provided by the MIMY partner institutions

## 2.8 Summary and chapter conclusions

Between 2010 and 2018, the top five destination countries for non-EU immigration in Europe are Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. When looking at the immigration stock, we find that the immigration process is still influenced by the former colonies. The top five highest communities of immigrants living in an EU28 country, or Norway and Switzerland are Moroccans living in France, followed by Indians in the UK, Moroccans in Spain, Pakistanis in the UK, and Syrians in Germany. In 2019, in Italy, Germany and Spain are living more than 5.5 million immigrants from countries with low or medium human development.

People holding no citizenship are being unprotected by any national legislation, so these persons are vulnerable in many aspects of life: they cannot work legally, own property, open a bank account or, in some cases, attend a school, getting married, register births, deaths, vote. Stateless people must face unique challenges. Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Slovenia cannot issue a birth certificate for children borne during the journey from their parents' countries of origin or residence to the EU<sup>43</sup>.

Top countries sheltering stateless people are Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden and the shares of the stateless and unknown citizenship increased with the Syrian crisis.

A special group of migrants in vulnerable conditions are unaccompanied minors. In 2009, 11455 unaccompanied minors (9160 males and 2280 females) from non-EU countries applied for asylum in one of the considered countries (except for Croatia). The highest rates registered in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In 2014, along with the Syrian crisis, the number of unaccompanied minors increased by 9 times and started to decrease overall in 2015. Germany hosts almost half of them.

The data show that younger individuals have the highest chance of being integrated into host societies.

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<sup>43</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a0ac8f94.pdf>

### 3 Integration of young migrants in vulnerable conditions

*Smaranda Cimpoeru and Monica Roman (ASE)*

This section assesses the integration of young people born outside the EU (referred also as “young migrants”) using a comparative approach with young natives (or “young nationals”). The comparison is made employing Eurostat indicators subdivided into four domains: labour, education, social inclusion, health. Most of the indicators used were proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration held in Zaragoza in 2010 (also known as the Zaragoza indicators). Where data is available, we also provide a gender gap perspective, in line with the MIMY intersectional approach regarding gender-based vulnerabilities of young migrants (Grant Agreement, pg. 20).

The focus of the descriptive analysis is on the evolution in the period 2010 – 2018, in EU, for each indicator and a country-level analysis for 2018. Eurostat data was used throughout the chapter, as collated in the MIMY Deliverable D2.1<sup>44</sup>. The main age group studied was 15 – 29 years or the closest available age interval (15-24 years, 15-34 years, 14-34 years, 18-24 years or 16-29 years).

Worth noticing that there are some data limitations, as also reported in the MIMY Deliverable D2.1. For Romania and Slovakia there was no data available for young people born outside the EU, while for some other countries there was limited availability of the indicators calculated for young people born outside the EU (these countries are: Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Croatia). Countries for which data was not available at non-EU born young population level were mentioned in footnotes for each sub-chapter.

*For producing meaningful results, note that the figures associated with the analysed indicators are constructed considering the specific country-of-birth and age interval. For instance, the employment rate for young migrants is calculated as the employed young migrants in the total young migrant population.*

#### 3.1 Labour integration

Six statistical indicators were used to evaluate the integration of young migrants on the labour market. The employment rate is analysed at general level, but also on different educational levels and for the persons who are no longer in education in training. Apart from the employment rate, activity and unemployment rates have also been inspected, as well as three indicators of a vulnerable working context: part-time employment, temporary employment, newly employment rate.

The full definition of the indicators is given in table A1 from the Annex.

##### **Labour market participation**

Participation in the labour market can be assessed using the activity rate that gives information about people who are economically active (employed or unemployed), otherwise known as the labour force. The activity rate is determined as percentage of the active population (employed population plus unemployed population) in the total population within the specific age, country of birth or gender group.

Between 2010 and 2018, in the EU, the **activity rate** for non-EU born young persons varied between 53% and 58% with low fluctuations, reaching 55.7% in 2018. For young nationals, the activity rates were very stable at around 56% throughout the mentioned period. Although the differences are not

<sup>44</sup> Roman, M., Cimpoeru, S., Manafi, I. & Prada, E. (2020) : MIMY D2.1 Macro-data inventory. Internal document.

very large, it is worth mentioning the deepened *gender gap for young people born outside the EU: in 2018 the activity rate for young migrant women (48.7%) was with about 14 percentage points lower than the one recorded for young migrant men (62.6%)*. This gap is only around 6.5 percentage points for young nationals.

The differences between activity rates for young native-born and non-EU born vary considerably at the country level. In 2018, in 14 countries (out of 26 that had available data<sup>45</sup>), activity rates were higher for the native-born young people rather than for the ones born outside the EU. The highest differences were recorded in Netherlands (activity rate higher with 14.4 percentage points for the young natives), United Kingdom (12.9 percentage points), Hungary (9.5 percentage points), Germany (8.6 percentage points). On the contrary, mostly in central and eastern parts of the EU, the activity rate was higher for young people born outside the EU than for young natives. This gap was very high in Latvia (the activity rate was higher with 25.6 points for young migrants), but also in Croatia (23.9 points higher), Greece (19 points), Poland (14 points), Portugal (13.4 points), Czechia (13.1 points).

The gender gap highlighted at the EU level is wider for some countries that report gaps larger than 20 points between the activity rates of young men and women born outside the EU. In 2018, these countries are<sup>46</sup>: Greece (activity rate for women is with 26.2 percentage points lower than for men), Italy (23.6 points), Croatia (23.4 points), Estonia (22.8 points), Austria (20.6 points).

**Employment rate** is the percentage of employed persons in the total population – active and inactive persons (within the same age, country of birth group). Starting with 2013, in the EU there is an *increasing trend of the employment rate of young migrants, from 38% (in 2013) to a maximum of 45.4% recorded in 2018*. The rate is still with 4.4 percentage points lower than that of young nationals. The gender gap (lower employment rates for women) is double for the foreign-born young population (11.9 percentage points at 2018) compared to young natives (5.4 percentage points). The country level<sup>47</sup> analysis for 2018 reveals a group of countries where the employment rates for young people born outside the EU are lower than those for young nationals: Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, Finland, Germany and Norway (Fig. 3.2). On the other hand, in central and east European countries the situation is opposite: in Latvia the employment rate for young people born outside the EU is larger with 24.5 percentage points than that of young natives, Croatia (22.7 points larger), Estonia (15.9 points), Poland (15.5 points). However, these countries register higher fluctuations in the employment rates in the period 2010 – 2018 compared to the first group of countries for which the gap remains more stable throughout the analysed period. The results at country level are mostly in line with those observed for the activity rates.

In all countries<sup>48</sup> analysed except Cyprus, there is a gender gap for young people born outside the EU, with women recording lower employment rates than men, the highest gaps being in Croatia.

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<sup>45</sup> No data for young people born outside the EU for Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia.

<sup>46</sup> Gender data not available for Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary.

<sup>47</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia.

<sup>48</sup> Gender data not available for Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary.




Figure 3.1. – Employment rates (%), 15 – 29 years, for women and men born outside the EU, EU countries<sup>49</sup>, the UK, and Norway, 2018

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

Next, analysing the employment rates on education levels, **we find that employment levels are highest for people with tertiary education and lowest for those with at most secondary education**, both for the young natives, as well as for young people born outside the EU<sup>50</sup>. However, some differences can be noticed. In 2018, the young natives with tertiary education have an employment rate of 63.1%, while young migrants with the same level of education have an employment rate of only 49.2%. The situation is reversed for young people with at most secondary education: an employment rate of 18.5% for young natives but 24.2% for young migrants. Young people born outside the EU with secondary non-tertiary education record an employment rate of 39.1% in 2018, with 8.1 percentage points lower than that of young natives with the same level of education.

Since many people in the analysed age group are still in some form of education, they may not be willing or they may not have time for a job. That is why analysing the **employment rates of young people not in education or training** becomes important. The indicator is available for the age group 15 – 34 years. The employment rate for the young migrants who are not in education or training stood at 63.9% in 2018, on a steady rise from the minimum level of the 2010 – 2018 period recorded in 2013 (57.5%). However, the rate is lower with 13.5 percentage points than that registered for young natives (77.4% at 2018). The highest gap is recorded for young people with *tertiary education*, the employment rate of young migrants being with 12.2 points lower than that of young natives (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 - Employment rates of young people (15 – 34 years) not in education and training, on education levels; EU28; 2018

Education level	Young people born outside the EU	Young natives	Gap
At most secondary education (EU28)	50.9%	54.5%	-3.6 points
• Germany	45.5%	56.7%	

<sup>49</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary.

<sup>50</sup> Employment rates on educational levels available for the age group 15 – 24 years

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	53.3%	41.8%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	55.4%	62.6%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	60.4%	63.5%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	62.9%	66.9%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	43.3%	64.3%	
Secondary up to tertiary education (EU28)	67%	78.9%	-11.9 points
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	74.4%	89.7%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	61.3%	62.5%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	67.6%	80.9%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	78.5%	89%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	69.4%	88.5%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	74%	86.6%	
Tertiary education (EU28)	75.5%	87.7%	-12.2 points
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	76.6%	94.6%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	59.6%	73.2%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	79.2%	91.3%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	81.3%	94.3%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	89.8%	94.5%	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany</li> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• UK</li> <li>• Sweden</li> <li>• Norway</li> <li>• Luxembourg</li> </ul>	76.1%	92.8%	

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

The analysis at country level<sup>51</sup> reveals that the highest negative gaps between employment rates for young people not in education or training born outside EU and natives are recorded in Germany (22 percentage points), Belgium (21.3 points), France (20.3 points).

Young people entering labour market know a higher risk of unemployment compared to adults. They are more likely to become inactive or to enter temporary and other non-standard forms of employment.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, as highlighted by Gauffin and Lytinen (2017) there is a high unemployment rate among youth, as well as among the refugee population. In this context, **unemployment rates of young migrants (15 – 29 years)** is a crucial indicator counting for integration.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, in the EU, the unemployment rate for young foreign-born increased (in the period 2010 – 2013), as well as the differences between foreign- and native-born young people. The maximum level of 31.2% was reached in 2013, being with 12.8 points higher than the unemployment rate of young natives. Thereafter, the youth unemployment rate fell for the next 5 years, reaching a low of 18.5% at 2018 for the population born outside EU, still with 7 points higher than the unemployment rate of the young natives (11.5%).

An analysis at the individual level for the EU states<sup>53</sup> in 2018 reveals that indeed *most countries report a higher unemployment rate for young migrants compared to young natives*. The exceptions in 2018 are Cyprus, Croatia, Italy, Czechia, Portugal with levels of unemployment slightly higher for the natives than for the foreign-born. The widest gaps were recorded in, Finland (unemployment rate higher with 11.4 percentage points for young migrants than for young natives), Belgium (10.6 points).

In 2018, the lowest unemployment rates for young migrants were in Czechia (3.7%), Cyprus (9.6%), Netherlands (10.4%), while the highest levels were recorded in Greece (32.4%), Spain (29.3%),

<sup>51</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia.

<sup>52</sup> [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_emp/documents/publication/wcms\\_544351.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_544351.pdf)

<sup>53</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.

Sweden (26%) (Fig. 3.2). Gender data is only partly available for young people born outside the EU<sup>54</sup>. Nonetheless, we notice the gender gap recorded in 2018 in Greece where the unemployment rate for young migrant women (38.5%) was with 10 percentage points higher than the unemployment rate of young migrant men. Sweden, as a consortium country, registers the widest gap of the unemployment rate (unemployment rate higher with 16.3 points for young migrants than for young natives), but also one of the highest unemployment rates of young migrants. At the other end, Italy reports one of the lowest gaps of the unemployment rate between the two categories.




Figure 3.2. Unemployment rate (%), 15 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>55</sup>, the UK and Norway, 2018

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

### Non-Standard forms of employment for young migrants: temporary employment, part-time employment, newly employed persons.

Temporary employment and part-time employment are included in the non-standard forms of employment that deviate from the standard employment. This deviation poses risks for workers, companies and society. Main risks are associated with lack of employment security (temporary workers face a greater risk of becoming unemployed), lower earnings, limited control over working hours (with implications for work-life balance) (ILO, 2016). For these reasons, it becomes important to know if young migrants are more exposed than young nationals to these forms of non-standard employment.

Temporary employees usually include:

- persons with seasonal employment;
- persons engaged by an agency or employment exchange and hired to a third party to perform a specific task;
- persons with specific training contracts.

<sup>54</sup> Only partly available data on genders for: Cyprus, Croatia, Czechia, Portugal, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Norway.

<sup>55</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.


The temporary employees' rate is calculated as percentage of temporary employees in the total number of employees (for the specific age, gender, country of birth group).

In 2018, in the EU, the *temporary employees rate reached a maximum of 38.5% (for the period 2010 – 2018) for young migrants*. It is also the year with the highest gap compared to young nationals: 6.6 percentage points higher. At the country level<sup>56</sup>, we highlight the case of Cyprus where the rate of young temporary employees born outside the EU is 3.2 times higher than that of young nationals. Except for Cyprus, other countries with high gaps between temporary employment levels for young migrants and natives are Czechia (temporary employment rate for young migrants is 1.6 times higher than that of young natives), consortium countries Poland (1.6 times) and Sweden (1.4 times), Belgium (1.4 times) (Fig. 3.3). The highest gender gap is recorded in Cyprus, where the indicator of temporary young migrant women is as high as 74.6% compared to only 31% for men

**Part-time employment** represents employees who work part-time as a percentage of total employment. In 2018, in the EU, *29% of employed young migrants worked part-time compared to only 23% of young natives*. The indicator had a low variability in the period 2010 - 2018, fluctuating around 29% - 32% for young migrants. At the country level, in 2018, 14 out of 20 countries<sup>57</sup> reported a higher level of part-time employment for young migrants than for young natives. Highest differences were recorded in Czechia (part-time employment for young migrants is 2.2 times higher than for young nationals), Belgium (1.48 times) Greece, Austria (1.3 times higher). Out of the consortium countries, Germany records a part-time employment rate 1.3 times higher for young migrants than for young natives. Only limited data available at gender level.

Lastly, **newly employed**<sup>58</sup> measures the share of people in the current job for 12 months or less, in total employment. In 2018, at EU level, *57.2% of young employed people born outside the EU were newly employed, 10 percentage points higher than young nationals*. The ratio of newly employed young people born outside the EU is on an *increasing trend from 46% in 2013*.

In 2018, in the consortium country Germany, the newly employment rate for young migrants is 1.35 higher than for young natives (highest gap), a situation occurring also in Sweden (1.2 times higher) and other countries like: Croatia, Ireland or Czechia. No available data at gender level.



<sup>56</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia.

<sup>57</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.

<sup>58</sup> Indicator available for the age group 15 – 24 years.

Figure 3.3. – Temporary employees (%), 15 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>59</sup>, the UK and Norway, 2018

*Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data*

### **Concluding remarks**


The macro-statistical data reveals that in EU, slightly more than half of young natives and the youngsters born outside the EU are economically active. The main results are also described by Infographic no 1:

- Young migrants are 1.3 more likely to work part time compared to natives and 1.2 more likely to have a temporary job.
- Less than half of young migrants with tertiary education are employed, compared to 63% of young natives.
- 18.5% of young migrants are unemployed in 2018, a record low for the 2010 – 2018 period.
- Young migrant women are more vulnerable than men on the labour market: only 40% of them are employed compared to half of men.

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<sup>59</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia.

### Infographic no. 1. Labour market integration of young people born outside the EU



## 3.2 Education

For evaluating the education level of young migrants and compare it with that of young nationals, we have used four Eurostat indicators. First, we consider the educational attainment levels: **low education level** (less than primary, primary and lower secondary education – levels 0, 1 and 2 of the ISCED 2011), **medium education level** (upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education – levels 3 and 4 of ISCED 2011) and high education level (tertiary education, ISCED 2011 levels 5, 6, 7 and 8). Other indicators analysed are young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET rate), early leavers from education, the participation rate in education. The full definition of the indicators is given in Table A2 from the Annexes.

### Educational attainment level of young migrants (15 – 24 years)

In 2018, in EU, *half of young migrants have a low education level, compared to 43.9% of young nationals*. Also the share of the non-EU28 born population with medium education is lower with 7.3 percentage points compared to that of young nationals with the same educational level. The ratio of the young non-EU28 born population with tertiary education appears to be slightly higher than the share of young nationals with the same level of education.

At country level<sup>60</sup> in 2018, we observe cases where the share of young migrants with at most secondary studies is significantly higher compared to young natives: Sweden (21.5 percentage points, Finland (18.6percentage points), Italy (15.7percentage points). In consortium country Sweden, there is an increase in the share of the young foreign population with low education level from 51.6% in 2010 to 68.6% in 2018. Countries where the *share of the foreign population with low education is higher than 60% in 2018 are Sweden (68.6%), Finland (67.4%), Italy (65.8%), Denmark (62.4%), Luxembourg (61.2%) – thus three of the consortium countries (Sweden, Italy, Luxembourg)*.

However, in consortium country UK, but also in Ireland, the share of the young foreign-born population with tertiary education is larger than the one of young nationals with tertiary education. In 2018, in the United Kingdom, 28.5% of young people born outside EU are reported with tertiary education compared to 18.2% of young nationals, while in Ireland 23.5% of young migrants compared to 12.3% of young nationals. The share of young people with tertiary education is around 10% at EU28 level.

### Neither in employment nor in education and training rates of young migrants (15 – 29 years)

*The NEET rate for young migrants-is almost double compared to that of young nationals (21.5% for young migrants compared to 12.1% for young nationals) for EU, in 2018. Nonetheless, the NEET rate of young migrants is decreasing after 2013. The NEET rate among young migrant women is 27.8% but only 15.3% for men.* However, the gender gap for young nationals is of only 3 percentage points.

At the country level<sup>61</sup> in 2018, the highest differences between NEET rates of young people born outside the EU and young nationals are recorded in: Greece, Slovenia and Belgium while the countries with the lowest gaps are Ireland or Croatia- (Figure 3.5). For the consortium countries, higher gaps are recorded in Germany, Luxembourg, while the lowest gap is in the United Kingdom. Italy reports a NEET rate above the EU average for both young migrants and young nationals, while in Sweden and Norway the NEET rates are below the EU average.

The widest gender gaps for young people born outside EU are recorded in Slovenia (NEET rate for young migrant women with 22.9 percentage points higher than that of young migrant men), closely followed by Greece and Italy, as a consortium country.

<sup>60</sup> For young people born outside EU there is limited available data for: Poland (low education not available); Portugal (high education not available), Hungary (low, high education not available); only a few values available for: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; no data for Romania, Slovakia;

<sup>61</sup> Data for young people born outside EU not available for: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia.




Figure 3.4. – Structure of non-EU28 born population by educational level, 15 – 24 years; comparison with the share of nationals with low education; part of EU countries and the United Kingdom; 2018

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data




Figure 3.5. NEET rates (%), 15 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>62</sup>, the United Kingdom and Norway, 2018

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

**Early leavers from education ratio (18 – 24 years)** represents the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 having attained at most lower secondary education and not being involved in further

<sup>62</sup> Data for young people born outside EU not available for: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia.

education or training. In 2018, the early leavers from education ratio at EU level for young people born outside EU was 20.7%, on a decreasing path from the maximum level of the period reached in 2010 (27.8%). *Young migrants are twice more likely than young natives to leave education early.* In some countries over a fifth of young migrants left education before attaining upper secondary education (2018 data): Italy (36.3%), Spain (31%), Malta (29.4%), Germany (23.4%), Austria (22.3%). The difference between young migrants and young natives' early leavers' ratio is very high in Greece (early leavers ratio of young migrants is 4.4 times higher than that of young nationals), Austria (4 times), Sweden (3.1 times), Slovenia (3 times), Italy (3 times), Germany (2.9 times). Consortium country United Kingdom is the only country where the early leavers ratio is lower for young migrants (6%) compared to young nationals (11%). However, other consortium countries register high values of early leavers ratio for young migrants: Italy, Germany or large gaps compared to the ratio for young nationals (like Sweden).

**Participation in education and training** is a measure of lifelong learning. The gap between participation rate in education for young natives and young migrants appears to be closing at the EU level in the period 2010 – 2018, from a difference of 6.9 percentage points in 2010 to 3.1 points in 2018, still higher for young natives. *In 2018, 55.8% of young people born outside the EU participate in formal and non-formal education and training.*

There is a high heterogeneity of the indicator at the country level<sup>63</sup>. In 2018, in some countries the participation rate in education for young people born outside EU is much lower than that of young natives: Greece (31.8 percentage points lower), Slovenia (28 points), Italy (21.1 points). On the other hand, there are several cases where the participation rate in education of young migrants is higher than the one of young natives: United Kingdom (21.5 percentage points higher for young migrants than for nationals), Hungary (10.4 points), Ireland (9.9 points), Finland (8.8 points). All of these four countries, and the UK in particular, attract relatively large number of students from outside the EU, mostly from Asia; however, it is very likely that these individuals are not all in vulnerable conditions.

There are no significant differences at gender level for the participation rate with some exceptions. In Cyprus, the participation rate for young migrant women is with 44.6 points lower than the participation rate of young migrant men. However, in Czechia, the participation rate of young migrant women is with 25.8 percentage points higher than the participation rate of young migrant men.

For the consortium countries, lower participation rates for young migrants are reported in Italy and Poland, while a better participation in education can be highlighted in Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway or Luxembourg (Figure 3.6).

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<sup>63</sup> Data for young people born outside EU not available for: Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.




Figure 3.6. Participation rate in education (%), 18 – 24 years, EU countries<sup>64</sup>, UK and Norway, 2018


Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

**To conclude,** young migrants are generally less educated than young nationals. However, in the United Kingdom and Ireland, the share of the young population born outside the EU with higher education is significantly higher than that of young nationals.

- Slightly more than *one in five young migrants is neither in employment nor in education and training, almost twice as much compared to young nationals. Young migrants are twice more likely to leave education early compared to young nationals.* Highest differences between early leavers ratio of young people born outside EU and young natives are recorded in Greece, Austria, Sweden, Slovenia, Italy, Germany. Half of young migrants have at most secondary studies.
- About a quarter of young migrant women are neither in employment nor in education and training, twice the level of the NEET rates for young national women.
- One in five young migrants leaves education early
- Young migrants are twice as likely to leave the education early as young natives.

<sup>64</sup> Data for young people born outside EU not available for: Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

## Infographic no. 2. Education level and participation in education of young people born outside the EU



### 3.3 Social inclusion

The social inclusion of young migrants is captured using seven indicators, covering the risk of poverty, in-work at-risk-of-poverty, material deprivation, the share of people living in households with very low work intensity, but also the housing situation (overcrowding rate and housing overburden cost rate). The full definition of the indicators is given in Table A3 from the Annexes.

#### Young migrants at risk of poverty or social exclusion (16 – 29 years). Comparison to young natives

Generally speaking, people at risk of poverty or social exclusion includes persons who are: at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators. The Eurostat data show that *the risk of poverty and social exclusion is almost double for young migrants compared to young*

natives (in 2018, the risk was 1.8 times higher for young people born outside EU compared to young natives). Next, we analyse in more detail the three sub-components of this indicator. *In 2018, the risk of poverty was 37.4% for young migrants, twice as high compared to young nationals (19%).* Throughout the period from 2010 to 2018, there was a steady evolution of the risk of poverty for young migrants,

Taking a closer look at the situation in each of the EU countries in 2018, with two exceptions (Latvia, Estonia), the share of young people born outside EU who were at risk of poverty is higher than the share of young nationals facing a similar risk (Figure 3.7). The situation in Latvia and Estonia could be due to their laws that restricted citizenship only to those having link to the countries prior to their occupation, thus leaving many Russian ethnics stateless<sup>65</sup> and thus not properly reported in the statistics.




Figure 3.7. At-risk of poverty rate (%), 16 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>66</sup>, UK and Norway, 2018

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

Large differences are recorded in Austria, France (where young people born outside the EU are 3.4 times as likely as young nationals to be at risk of poverty), Cyprus (3.1 as likely), Sweden (2.9 as likely), Belgium (2.8 as likely), Slovenia, Luxembourg (2.6 as likely), Spain, and Netherlands (2.1 as likely). Lower gaps are observed in Germany, Italy (1.3 as likely) or Portugal (1.1 as likely). Greece registered a sharp decrease in the risk of poverty for young migrants, that reached a peak of 62.1% in 2013, fluctuated over the next four years and fell to a low of 36.2% in 2018. At consortium countries level, highest poverty rates of young migrants (and consistent differences compared to young natives) are in Sweden, Norway or Luxembourg, while lower gaps and poverty rates of young migrants are reported in Germany and United Kingdom.

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.statelessness.eu/blog/not-just-simple-twist-fate-statelessness-lithuania-and-latvia>

<sup>66</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia; for Poland data available only for 2019 – low reliability.

Another aspect related to social vulnerability is covered by the poverty risk of people who work. In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate refers to individuals who are classified as employed according to their most frequent activity status and are at risk of poverty. In 2018, for the EU28, *24.7% of young employed people born outside the EU were at risk of poverty, while the share for young nationals was lower, at 8.8%*. Data at EU28 aggregated level for young migrants is available only for 2017 and 2018 with similar levels of the indicator. In 2018, three countries<sup>67</sup> have the share of young employed migrants who are at risk of poverty above 30%: Denmark (53%), Spain (36.2%), Netherlands (33.8%).

The second measure of social vulnerability is the **severe material deprivation rate**, defined as the share of people unable to afford at least four out of nine specified items, considered elements of existential dignity.<sup>68</sup> The analysis over the 2010 – 2018 period shows a declining trend of the severe material deprivation rate in EU starting from 2012 to reach a minimum level in 2018. The *severe material deprivation rate at 2018 is double for young migrants (12.5%) compared to young nationals (6.1%)*, while in 2010 it was 1.7 times higher. Looking in more detail at the situation in each country, the highest share of young people born outside the EU *facing severe material deprivation was registered in Greece, with almost 40% of people affected in 2018*. However, in the context of the severe economic and financial crisis that hit Greece, the rate was higher than 50% from 2012 throughout 2017 (57.3%), thus the level reached in 2018 is the lowest in the period 2011 – 2018. It can be observed in Figure 3.8, that *the rate in Greece was considerably higher than in any other Member State (or Norway)*, nonetheless some other countries record rates of over 20%: Cyprus, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, France. Germany, consortium country, registers an all-time low rate of 2.8% in 2018, a considerable fall from a peak of 15.3% in 2015. In the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg the share of young people born outside the EU suffering from severe material deprivation is more than four times as high as the share for young natives. The very large gap is mainly due to the low levels of the severe material deprivation rate for young natives in the mentioned countries.

Although there are no systematic differences at gender level, for Ireland, starting with 2015 the severe material deprivation rate of young migrants is significantly higher for women (13.7% in 2018) compared to men (2.8% in 2018).

The third aspect of social inclusion deals with **people living in households with very low work intensity** - these are households where on average the individuals work 20% or less of their total work potential during the past year. It is a sign of progress towards a better social inclusion that in the EU, the share of *young migrants living in households with very low work intensity decreased steadily from a peak of 21.7% in 2014 to a minimum level of 13.6% in 2018*, approaching the levels reported for young nationals (9.5% in 2018). In 2018, some countries<sup>69</sup> report more than one quarter of young migrants live in households with low work intensity: Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, France, Belgium, Finland, and Sweden. At the other end of the range, we have countries where the indicator is lower than 10%: Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy. In consortium country Italy, the share of young migrants living in households with very low work intensity is much lower (5.4%) than that of young natives (15.5%), being the country with the highest negative gap.

<sup>67</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia; limited availability for: Malta (only 2010 – 2014), Poland (only 2019). No data available on genders  
68 1) to pay rent/mortgage or utility bills on time, 2) to keep home adequately warm, 3) to face unexpected expenses, 4) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, 5) a one-week holiday away from home, 6) a car, 7) a washing machine, 8) a colour TV, 9) a telephone.

<sup>69</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia; for Poland data available only for 2019 (low reliability).




Figure 3.8. – Severe material deprivation rate, 16 - 29 Y (%), EU countries<sup>70</sup>, UK and Norway, 2018.

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

**Housing conditions** are a standard way of analysing the social inclusion of young migrants. We use two indicators to evaluate the housing aspects of young migrants: the overcrowding rate and the housing cost overburden. The overcrowding rate is defined as the percentage of the population living in an overcrowded household - a household that does not have at its disposal a minimum of rooms defined by certain criteria.<sup>71</sup>

Over the period 2010 – 2018, the overcrowding rate for young people born outside EU slightly fluctuated between 30% and 36%, the peak being reached in 2018 at 35.9%. By contrast, the overcrowding rate for young natives had a declining path starting from 2013, reaching a low of 21.9% in 2018. Consequently, *the overcrowding rate for young migrants was 1.6 times as high as the rate for young nationals in 2018 (the maximum gap registered between 2010 and 2018).*

At country level, in 2018, more than half of young people born outside EU were living in overcrowded households in Greece, Italy, Sweden, Croatia, Austria, Latvia. On the opposite side, only in Cyprus and Malta, the overcrowding rate was below 10%. There are large differences in the overcrowding rates between young migrants and young natives: Spain (overcrowding rate for young migrants 5.8 times higher than for young natives), Luxembourg (5.07 times), Belgium (4.75 times), Ireland (4.25 times), Netherlands, Austria (3.5 times), United Kingdom (3.1 times). However, for some countries, the gap between young migrants and nationals is lower due to the high overcrowding rate also for locals (as it is the case for Croatia or Latvia – see Figure 3.9). Italy and Sweden – as consortium countries – report higher overcrowding rates for young migrants, while Luxembourg records a high gap of the overcrowding rate between young migrants and nationals. At the other end, Germany and UK report lower value and gaps for the young migrants' overcrowding rate.

At gender level, it appears that young migrant men are more likely to live in overcrowded households compared to women. In 2018, in Luxembourg, Greece, Austria, Spain, Finland, Portugal and Norway the overcrowding rate for men is higher with more than 10 percentage points than the overcrowding rate for women.

<sup>70</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia; low reliability for Malta, Estonia; Poland (only 2019).

<sup>71</sup> one room for the household; one room by couple in the household; one room for each single person aged 18 and more; one room by pair of single people of the same sex between 12 and 17 years of age; one room for each single person between 12 and 17 years of age and not included in the previous category; one room by pair of children under 12 years of age.




Figure 3.9. - Overcrowding rate (%), 16 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>72</sup>, the UK and Norway, 2018.

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

The housing cost overburden rate is defined as the percentage of the population living in a household where total housing costs represent more than 40% of the total disposable household income. The housing cost overburden rate for young people born outside the EU is on a downward path since 2014 (29.5%) reaching a low of 23.8% in 2018. Still, *the rate is twice as high compared to the one registered for young nationals*. In 2018, the highest housing cost overburden rate for young migrants is recorded, by far, in Greece with a level of 70.6%, still lower than the highest rate reported in 2014 – 87%. Next highest rates were reported in Denmark (38.8%), Spain (33.1%), Netherlands (27.3%). Less than 10% of young migrants overburdened by housing costs are reported in Portugal, Cyprus, Finland, Croatia. Except for Finland, Norway, Croatia and Germany where the gaps between young migrants and natives are very small or even positive, the other countries report very high gaps mainly due to the low level of the cost overburden rate for young natives.

## Conclusions

The indicators presented above describe a less favourable situation of young migrants compared to natives at all dimensions of social inclusion. Close to half of young migrants are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, almost double of the native-born. In Austria, Cyprus, Belgium, France, Sweden the risk of poverty experienced by young migrants is around three times as high as that experienced by young natives.

Adding to this, the severe material deprivation rate of young migrants is twice as high as the rate for young natives. Greece records a noticeable higher rate than most EU countries. There are high differences in the severe material deprivation rates for young migrants and young natives mostly in developed countries, with low levels recorded for natives.


Regarding the housing conditions, about one in three young people born outside EU lives in an overcrowded household compared to one in five young nationals. In 2018 more than half of young migrants live in overcrowded households in Greece, Italy, Sweden, Croatia, Austria, Latvia.

<sup>72</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia; for Poland data available only for 2019 (low reliability).

The main results are listed below are they are also provided in a comprehensive graphical manner in Infographic no. 3 and show that:

- Almost 40% of young migrants are at-risk-of poverty, twice as much as young natives;
- A quarter of young migrants are at risk of in-work poverty;
- About one in three migrants lives in an overcrowded household, compared to one in five young natives;
- A quarter of young migrants are overburdened by the housing cost, more than double the rate for young natives.

### Infographic no. 3. Social inclusion of young people born outside the EU



### 3.4 Health

Health status may be a strong indicator of vulnerability in the case of young migrants, therefore it is important to assess the health indicators of young migrants and to mirror them with those of young

natives. In this respect, five indicators provided by Eurostat are used. They emerge from the European Statistics of Income and Living Condition (EU-SILC) survey, Health module. The variables on health status represent the so called Minimum European Health Module (MEHM), and measures 3 different concepts of health: Self-perceived health; Chronic morbidity (people having a long-standing illness or health problem); Activity limitation – disability (self-perceived long-standing limitations in usual activities due to health problems).

### **Self-perceived health and limitations due to health problems of young migrants (16 – 29 years).**

In 2018, for the EU, *91.1% of young migrants perceive their health status as good and very good* while 90.4% of young nationals do so. 8.1% of young people born outside the EU consider they have a fair health condition and only 0.8% a bad health status (compared to 1.9% of young nationals).

Some countries report a lower weight of young migrants who perceive their health status as good and very good. These are Poland (81.7% of young migrants perceive themselves with good and very good health status, 9.4 points lower than young nationals), Netherlands (84.3%, 4.7 points lower than young nationals), Austria (85.1%, 5.2 points lower than nationals). In Croatia, Czechia, Greece, Ireland and Malta more than 95% of young migrants consider they have a good and very good health status.

In 2018, *93.7% of young migrants in EU declared they had no limitations due to health problems, compared to 90.5% of young nationals*. Only 1.2% of young migrants declared to have severe limitations due to health problems, while 2.4% of young nationals did so. In two consortium countries, there appears to be a slightly better health assessment of young migrants than of young natives. More precisely, in the United Kingdom, 7.1% of young migrants reported in 2018 to have some or severe limitations due to health issues, a lower weight than young nationals (17.6%). Similarly, in Luxembourg, only 4.2% of young migrants consider they are severe or moderately limited due to health problems, but 14% of young nationals consider themselves as such.

### **Young migrants having a long-standing illness or health problem (16 – 24 years).**

There is an increasing trend of young migrant who report suffering from a long-standing illness or health problems from 2011 (23.5%) reaching a maximum level of 29.1% in 2018. Still, the weight of young migrants with long-standing illness or health problems *remains slightly lower than that of young nationals* within the same category (30.6% of young nationals reporting a long-standing illness in 2018). The Baltic countries<sup>73</sup> report higher weights of young migrants with long-standing illness for 2018: Estonia (49.7%, 13.8 points higher than young nationals), Lithuania (38.8%, 16.3 points higher than young nationals), Latvia (37.4%, 9.7 points higher than young nationals).

### **Young migrants who report unmet needs for medical and dental examination (16 – 29 years). Comparison with young natives**

Only 2% of young people born outside the EU report unmet medical needs for medical examination, similar to 2.5% of young nationals (2018, EU28). 0.7% of young migrants have unmet needs because they consider the medical services too expensive. In some countries, this ratio is higher: Greece (6% of young migrants perceive the services too expensive vs. 4% of young natives); Belgium (3.9% of young migrants but only 0.9% of young natives); Ireland (2.3% of young migrants and only 0.9% of young natives).

However, the share of young migrants reporting unmet needs for dental examination is larger – 4.2% in 2018, EU. The figure is higher than that of young natives reporting unmet needs of the same type: 3% in 2018. 3.2% of young migrants said they have unmet dental needs because their examination was too expensive, while only 1.6% of young natives think so. In Greece, 10.3% of young migrants declared that the reason they have unmet needs for dental examination was their financial burden, while Norway reports the highest ratio – 12.5%.

<sup>73</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia.

**Concluding remarks**

Generally, there are very small differences in the perceived health status of young migrants and young nationals. Almost 30% of young migrants report they suffer from a long-standing illness or health problem in 2018, on an increasing trend from 2011. In the Baltic countries, more than a third of young migrants reported having a long-standing illness or health problem. More than 90% of young people born outside the EU declare not having unmet needs for a medical or dental examination, thus a good health status. The price of the dental examination procedures is the main reason the young migrants report unmet dental examination needs.

## 4 Who are the vulnerable youth in Europe?

*Vera Messing and Bence Ságvári (CEU)*

MIMY project's focus is on the experience, visions of young migrants with third country nationality in vulnerable conditions in Europe (referred to as vulnerable migrant youth in this paper) and their opportunities of social inclusion. In this chapter using quantitative (survey) data we offer a wider, bird's-eye view on this social group and their situation. We show which young migrants are exposed to vulnerable conditions in Europe and present some of their key features, such socio-demographic traits, family background, household setting as well as their attitudinal characteristics. We also describe how they are different from their peers with no immigrant background and from those who are not in a vulnerable position.

We will change perspective in this chapter: as opposed to the previous chapters, in which macro level statistical data about immigrants were described, this chapter will present an analysis of micro (individual) level data that allows to focus on factors that may be correlated with vulnerable position of TCN immigrant youth. With this analysis we aim to contribute to MIMY's key objective "to promote a radically situational approach to integration – a lens through which micro-processes on the individual and institutional level as well as the ecological inter-linkage between these levels will come into perspective." (Skrobanek 2020:25)

### 4.1 Chapter Introduction

The MIMY project takes a broad perspective regarding its two key concepts: *integration* and *vulnerability*. MIMY's focus is on young immigrants who experience vulnerable conditions like 'being under-aged in the migration process', 'seeking asylum', 'being a refugee', 'being undocumented', 'having no parents', 'having no nationality', 'not having legal status', 'low physical or psychological wellbeing', 'exposed to negative life events', 'adverse childhood experiences', 'illness', 'injuries', 'disabilities', 'social, cultural and economic exclusion' etc. (Consortium, 2019: 8).

In this chapter, however, we will – instead of looking at pre-defined categories – observe various dimensions of integration and disadvantages in those dimensions. *We consider that vulnerable position of young immigrants occurs concerning opportunities of integration on various dimensions of social life.* MIMY's key concept is liquid integration, that regards integration as an ever ongoing process in which immigrants and local society impact each other constantly. *"Integration processes – in a radically processual perspective, at both individual and structural level – must be understood as non-linear, contingent, unpredictable and variable over the course of time."* (Skrobanek and colleagues 2020: 17).

Similarly to integration, vulnerability is not a static state of a person, it is not given, but an ever changing, fluid position: individuals may enter into and step out of vulnerable position at certain points in their lives, even repeatedly. However, in this chapter we are able to provide only a snapshot - a static picture - of vulnerable youth and will not be able to follow the process of entering and stepping out of vulnerable situation. WP5, 6 and 7 applying qualitative methods for empirical research will be able to delineate the processes.

Based on the socio-ecological perspective introduced in the first work package of MIMY (Skrobanek and colleagues 2020), which addresses the four MMEM (macro-meso-exo-micro) level we will observe young migrants' exposure to vulnerability with regard to their chances of social integration

at the meso- and micro levels: family background, migration characteristics, as well as personal attitudes, perception of wellbeing, experiences of discrimination.

## 4.2 Data and methods

### 4.2.1 Data source

In the following two chapters, that analyse micro level data, we use data offered by the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is conducted every second year since 2002 in a majority of European countries and thus allows for both cross country and time series comparison. The data is representative of all persons aged 15 and over (no upper age limit) resident within private households in each of the 27 countries, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language. The survey applies very rigorous methodological standards to ensure comparability across various countries, languages and time. (for more details see [europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology](http://europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology)).

In chapter 4 we use an aggregated dataset from all the nine survey rounds (every second year between 2002 and 2018). We selected those respondents, who were younger than 30 at the time of the survey. The dataset includes 20 countries that took part in more than six out of the nine survey rounds.<sup>74</sup> Altogether the sample includes 58,458 respondents aged under 30 out of which 3,187 are TCN immigrants (1,653 are EU mobile youth and the rest, over 53 thousand are the native youth). However, similarly to macro statistical population data, there are large differences in the share (and numbers) of TCN immigrants in European countries in the ESS survey: while there are hardly any immigrant youth in the samples of the post-communist countries in Central East Europe (7 in Poland, 14 in Hungary and 25 in Czechia) six countries provide over half (56%) of the sample (Norway, UK, Switzerland, Germany, Spain and Sweden). Thus, when making conclusions about immigrant youth in vulnerable condition, we need to keep in mind that the sample, we are drawing such conclusions from includes data that represents EU member countries unevenly: some old EU member-states with a large immigrant population provide the vast majority of the sample, while we won't be able to draw conclusions about the vulnerability of immigrant youth in new EU member-states in Central East Europe.

### 4.2.2 Concept of immigrant

Another issue that needs to be addressed in this section concerns the conceptualization of the category of immigrant. In this study, we use a widely recognized conceptualization of the **migrant** category: **those whose country of birth is different from where they live at present**. This is the most transparent and most frequently used conceptualization of the category – even though, in rare cases, it may mean that the individual does not actually have a migrant background or identity at all (e.g. people born in a foreign country while their parents were merely visiting that country for a short while). This definition also disregards migrant ancestry: namely those who, although they were born in the country where they live, have parents of foreign descent (second-generation migrants). This conceptualization also disregards important elements of identity making, such as language use or identification with an ethnic group.

Even though our focus is limited to 20 countries, immigrants comprise a very heterogeneous population in terms of their origin, cultural heritage, religion and years since their migration occurred – that is, in terms of the traits that are essential for social integration. We had to come up with some way of managing such diversity, without fragmenting our analysis so far as to end up with groups

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<sup>74</sup> Austria (6), Belgium (9), Switzerland (9), Czechia (8), Germany (9), Denmark (7), Estonia (8), Spain (9), Finland (9), France (9), UK (9), Hungary (9), Ireland (9), Lithuania (5), Netherlands (9), Norway (9), Poland (9), Portugal (9), Sweden (9) and Slovenia (9). (The number of survey rounds in the integrated dataset are in parentheses.)

consisting of just a handful of people. Thus, the following categorization of immigrant background will be applied: EU mobile youth (those, whose country of origin is an EU/EEA member-state) and third-country nationals (TCN, otherwise known as non-EU migrants). We also used non-migrant (local) population as reference group throughout the analysis.

### 4.2.3 Concept of vulnerability

In the introduction it has been explained that in this chapter we will focus on young immigrants in vulnerable conditions as regards to their opportunities of integration on various dimensions of social life. A multi-dimensional and multi-layered indicator of vulnerability was constructed for this analysis based on dimensions identified by the Zaragoza Declaration and indicators of integration (EC 2010). It takes into account four key dimensions of social integration and represents vulnerability in the sense of being disadvantaged along any or several of the following dimensions.<sup>75</sup>

1. The first dimension is education. In operational terms this dimension identifies as disadvantaged those
  - a. who have and ISCED 1 (elementary 4 or 6 years) degree at most below the age of 20 and
  - b. those who have ISCED 2 (compulsory education without no upper secondary degree) in the age group of 21-29.
2. The second dimension is income. We combined two measures of income (objective and subjective) to assess general low income status of individuals. Those are considered as having low income who
  - a. either reported that their income is not or hardly sufficient for subsistence (low subjective income)
  - b. or whose income falls into the lowest income quintile (lowest 20% of the population in terms of household income)
3. The third dimension is labour market exclusion. We used the EU indicator of NEET (Not in Education, Employment or Training) regarding those youth as vulnerable who are not in education or training and are unemployed. In compliance with EUROSTAT indicator individuals working in the household are not regarded as being vulnerable.
4. The fourth dimension is health. We combined two measures – objective and subjective – of health. Those were considered as having poor health who either reported having poor or very poor health (subjective health) or who reported being hampered in daily activities by illness or disability (objective health).

Being disadvantaged on any or several of the above four dimensions<sup>76</sup> increases significantly the risk of failed social integration and therefore we interpret these as key dimensions of vulnerability despite our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of vulnerability.

The indicator that takes into account the above four dimensions has three value:

- (1) *Not at risk of being vulnerable along any of the four dimensions (not vulnerable)*
- (2) *At risk of being vulnerable in one dimension (one-dimensional vulnerability)*
- (3) *At risk of being vulnerable in two or more dimensions (multi-dimensional<sup>77</sup> or intersectional vulnerability).*

The figure below demonstrates the distribution of vulnerability categories among non-immigrants, EU mobile youth and TCN youth.

<sup>75</sup> Although we know there is far more to integration and vulnerability than the listed four dimensions, still we literature refers to these fields as key to social integration.

<sup>76</sup> A fifth key dimension would be housing conditions. However, although the ESS includes information on housing conditions, but these questions are filled in by the interviewer (and not the respondent) and is not reliable due to high number of missing answers (that is also seriously biased across time and space, i.e. survey rounds and countries). Therefore we do not include housing conditions in the main indicator of this study.

<sup>77</sup> We use the label multi-dimensional across the charts of the report.




Figure 4.1. The share of young TCN immigrants by categories of vulnerability and the internal structure of their vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

As expected, the share of vulnerable youth among TCN immigrants is pointedly higher compared to natives and also EU mobile youth. (Figure 4.1, part 1) Less than half of TCN immigrant youth has no vulnerabilities and 37% face the risk of vulnerability in one of the four dimensions. The difference between TCN immigrant youth and natives is especially large concerning intersectional vulnerability: 21% of TCN immigrant youth faces the risk of multiple vulnerabilities, while this share is only 12% among youth born in the country of residence. ( $\chi(4) = 539.9, p = .000$ )

The middle and lower parts of the figure present the internal structure among one- and multidimensional vulnerable youth that is the weight of the four elements within each group.

Having low income and low education are the most significant factors of being at risk of vulnerability but while non-immigrants and EU mobile youth are primarily disadvantaged because of low education, TCN immigrants are more frequently in vulnerable position because of low income. Bad health is a very infrequent reason for one-dimensional vulnerability and exclusion from education and labour market position is also atypical. (Figure 4.1, part 3)

Focusing on those young people who face multiple disadvantages we see that low level of education and low income come hand in hand. Every four out of five TCN youth in this situation have either low level of education and/or low income. (Figure 4.1, part 3) Being excluded from labour market and education is also an important, though less significant factor for this group: half of TCN youth facing multiple vulnerabilities are in the NEET category. As comparison, not being in education or in employment is a more frequent reason for non-immigrant youth to be at risk of multiple vulnerabilities.

In sum, we may say that low education and low income are the primary reason for becoming vulnerable irrespective of immigrant background. However, TCN youth are more likely to struggle with intersectional vulnerability because of these two factors, while among non-immigrants not

being in education or in employment as well as bad health is a more significant cause of vulnerability than for TCN youth.

We also checked how housing conditions influence vulnerability but did not include these in the construction of the main indicator of vulnerability due to methodological reasons (see footnote 3 for details). However, it is a telling piece of information, that the share of youth living in bad housing conditions (including the state of the building, the amount of litter and vandalism in the direct environment) is significantly higher among TCN immigrants (16%) than among non-immigrants or EU mobile people (9 and 10%).




Figure 4.2. Housing conditions of youth with migrant and non-migrant background

*Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data*

There are 13 countries in which the sample size of TCN immigrant youth (roughly above 100 cases per country) allows for further analysis on a country level<sup>78</sup>.

<sup>78</sup> In Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Denmark, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia the number of TCN immigrant youth was below 100, thus too small to provide country specific shares of the three groups of vulnerability.




Figure 4.3 Share of TCN immigrant youth facing one- and multi-dimensional vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Being an immigrant youth affects the risks of vulnerability rather differently in different countries of Europe. In Norway, Switzerland and Germany approximately half of TCN immigrant youth struggle with some kind of disadvantage on one of the four dimensions of social integration, but in other countries this share is higher: in Austria 75%, in Portugal and Spain 67% and 65%. The most significant indicator of immigrant youth's vulnerability is the share of those who struggle with multiple vulnerabilities. Youth in Austria are in the worst position in this respect: a third of them face vulnerably condition in two or more spheres of social integration. The situation of immigrant youth is also difficult in Spain, Portugal Belgium. Concerning MIMY partner countries, TCN immigrant youth is doing better compared to European averages: in Norway, Sweden and Germany the share of those facing risk vulnerability in more than one dimension of social integration is among the lowest (13% and 18%), while in the UK every fifth is in such a situation (compared to much higher shares in the Mediterranean countries and Austria). Although the ESS has too little data on TCN migrant youth in Hungary and Poland to make statistically founded statements, but they are supporting findings of macro level data in showing that in these countries TCN immigrants are relatively well situated concerning the four dimension of integration even compared to the mainstream population and have low chances of becoming vulnerable.

### 4.3 Factors correlated with vulnerability

In the following section we will describe various factors that are in relationship with disadvantaged position on dimensions of social integration and higher risks of vulnerability of TCN immigrant youth.

The first aspect we investigate concerns how country of origin corresponds with the risk of vulnerability. Figure 4.4 shows the share of various groups of vulnerability among immigrants coming from larger regions of the world.




Figure 4.4. Vulnerability of TCN immigrant youth by region of origin<sup>79</sup>

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

The region of migrants' origin matters a lot in terms of the chances of being vulnerable and especially in terms of multi-dimensional vulnerability. (Figure 4.4) Immigrants who have European descent (coming from countries of the former post-communist block and USSR) are the least likely to live in vulnerable condition while those from North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa and from the Middle East have the greatest chance to be disadvantaged along one or several dimensions of social integration. Approximately a third of those who arrived from Africa to Europe are likely to become vulnerable in multiple ways.

The question that naturally arises here: is vulnerability related to discrimination primarily targeting those young people who are easily identifiable as immigrants, i.e. visibly different from the mainstream population? The figure below represents the three groups and the share of those, who perceive being targets of discrimination.

<sup>79</sup> (1) countries with post-communist heritage include countries (i.e. countries in the Balkans and ex-Soviet countries); (2) countries of the Middle East (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and North African countries); (3) North Africa (4) Sub-Saharan Africa; (4) South and East Asia (including India, China and the Indochinese Peninsula); (5) Latin America. We have disregarded immigrants arriving from the Pacific, North America and Israel, as these are very small groups and are hard to include in any of the above categories.




Figure 4. 5. Perceived level of discrimination among youth with migrant and non-migrant background  
 Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Over a fifth (22%) of TCN immigrant youth feels that they are targets of discrimination, but among those, who face multiple vulnerabilities this share is significantly higher (31%). (Figure 4.5) These shares are much lower among EU mobile and non-immigrants youth in all categories (*for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 50.9, p = .000$ ; for non-immigrant:  $\chi(2) = 19.4, p = .000$* ) Based on the data, we can't draw a cause and effect relationship: is being discriminated against the cause for becoming more vulnerable; or contrarily, being vulnerable (especially facing disadvantages on one or several dimensions of life) is the reason for being more frequently discriminated or both aspects are an effect of a third variable (i.e. process of exclusion).

Another important predictor of vulnerability is religious denomination, that is narrowed here to the status of being Muslim.




Figure 4.6. The influence of belonging to particular religion on the risk of vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Data show that in both native and TCN youth group the likelihood of vulnerability is higher among young people identifying as Muslims than among others. (Figure 4.6) However, being Muslim and TCN immigrant increases chances of being in vulnerable conditions and also of facing intersecting vulnerability. (for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 67.8, p = .000$ ; for non-immigrant:  $\chi(2) = 58.350, p = .000$ ) Only 35% of TCN immigrants of Muslim faith are not vulnerable as opposed to 46% of those TCN youth who have other faith. But struggling with vulnerabilities on more than one sphere of social integration is almost twice as frequent (29%) among TCN immigrants of Muslim faith than among those identifying as non-Muslims (17%).

*As a conclusion to this section we would highlight that coming from regions of the world where the dominant race is different from Europeans, being Muslim as well as being discriminated against all add to the chances of becoming vulnerable, especially to the chances of struggling with several disadvantages across the four spheres of social integration.*

In the next section we overview how some of the basic personal and family characteristics that are usually associated with vulnerability, such as gender, education, household setting and partnership, having a child and residence influence the chances of vulnerability.

Analysing the data, we found, that contrarily to expectations, gender does not make a significant difference: vulnerability is only slightly less frequent among TCN women (57%) than men (59%). The same is true for the share of those facing intersecting vulnerabilities: 20% of TCN women and 23% of TCN man struggle with disadvantages along more than one out of the four dimensions of integration (education, labour market, poverty, health).

As a sound body of literature shows, parents' social position plays a central role in youth's chances of being disadvantaged. We use educational level of parents as a signal of parental social background. The next figure presents the share of youth in the three categories of vulnerability by the level of education of their parents.




Figure 4.7. Relationship between parental background and risk of vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Low education is regarded as 'low' if none of the parents have completed ISCED2 level education (meaning did not graduate from upper secondary education). In contemporary societies parents' education is one, if not the most important predictor of a persons' educational career (for example Wiesner 2003, Schnabl et al 2002, Dustmann 2004). The interesting finding we see is that parents' education correlates with the chances of becoming vulnerable less among TCN youth than among natives. (Figure 4.7) Although the share of one- and multidimensional vulnerability is much higher among all groups of TCN immigrants, still low level education of parents increases the chances of being disadvantaged by 50% (51% of those with parents having at least ISCED 2 level education become in one or several ways disadvantages as opposed to 75% among those whose parents have low education), while among natives the share of youth being vulnerable in one or multiple ways is almost twice as high among those whose parents have low education (71%) than among those whose parents are better educated (39%). (for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 2260.9, p = .000$ ; for non-immigrant:  $\chi(2) = 1959.9, p = .000$ )

Living in partnership (with husband/ wife or partner) does not really make a difference in terms of chances of becoming vulnerable. The share of those struggling with multiple vulnerability is almost identical among TCN immigrants a non-immigrants. However, having children, correlates with the chances of vulnerability in all groups but this relationship is especially salient for TCN youth.




Figure 4.8. Relationship between having a child and risk of vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

The share of TCN youth facing any kind of disadvantage is over 10% higher among those who raise children. The difference becomes especially prominent if we look at multiple vulnerabilities: 29% of those TCN youth who have children struggle with more than one dimension of disadvantages, while this share is only 19% among those who have no children. (*for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 45.8, p = .000$ ; for non-immigrant:  $\chi(2) = 779.4, p = .000$* ) We, however don't have any data to establish the direction of this correlation: do immigrant youth become vulnerable (i.e. drop out of education before graduating upper secondary school, become poor, drop out of the labour market) because they raise children or contrarily, youth struggling with multidimensional disadvantages (have low education, have financial problems or are excluded from the labour market) are more likely to give birth at a relatively early age.

And finally, we also checked how patterns of residence correlate with vulnerability. We didn't find correlation in this respect: slightly higher share of TCN immigrants living in urban environment are in the position of multidimensional vulnerability (21%) as opposed to those living in rural setting (19%). We presume that in different countries rural versus urban residence have a different influence on social integration of immigrant youth, but the sample size is too small to check for country specific differences of the residence patterns.

*Concluding this subsection we may say that out of the key socio-demographic factors raising children correlate with higher chances of vulnerability the most, especially for TCN immigrant youth; gender, household setting as well as residence correlates with vulnerability to a much smaller extent or not at all. In accordance with theories of social mobility we found that parent's education is also a very important factor of being at risk of vulnerability, however, low level of education of parents predicts youth's vulnerability for TCN immigrants to a smaller extent than for non-immigrants.*

The next dimension of the analysis focuses on factors related to the conditions of young immigrants' integration (i.e. whether they have citizenship, speak the language of the country of destination and the time they have spent in the country). The following figures present these aspects and compare TCN immigrants to EU mobile youth.




Figure 4.9. Relationship between citizenship and risk of vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Holding citizenship of the destination country matters in terms of the chances of becoming vulnerable for TCN youth. (Figure 4.9) In the case of young people mobile within the EU it does not matter at all. 62% of non-citizen TCN youth struggle with one- or multi-dimensional vulnerability, while this share is 51% for those who hold citizenship of the host country. The share of those facing disadvantages in more than one sphere of life is higher by 8% among TCN youth not holding citizenship of the host country compared to those who are citizens, already. (for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 58.5, p = .000$ ; for non-immigrant:  $\chi(2) = 40.4, p = .000$ )

Another aspect which might correlate with the chances of integration is time spent since arrival to the host country. Unfortunately, data (the sample size) allows for only a very unsophisticated comparison, in which two categories are differentiated: those who arrived within 5 years, and those who live in the country for over 5 years. The following figure shows this aspect comparatively between TCN and EU mobile youth.




Figure 4.10. Relationship between time spent in the host country and risk of vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Similarly to citizenship, we see that time spent in the host country correlates with vulnerabilities more for TCN than for EU mobile youth. There is no significant relationship between these two variables among EU mobile youth, but there is among TCN youth. 60% of TCN youth who live in the host country for over 5 years face some kind of vulnerable position, while the same share is 70% for those who are relatively recent migrants. Again, the time spent in the destination country seems to influence the chances of becoming vulnerable along several dimensions of integration: 28% of recent while 19% of long term TCN youth struggles with disadvantages in more than one sphere of social integration. (for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 20.6$ ,  $p = .000$ ; for EU mobile:  $\chi(2) = 1.8$ ,  $p = .402$ )

And finally, one of the most important factors influencing the chances of integration is language. The ESS includes questions on the language used in the home environment and with friends. Immigrants being fluent in the host country's language as much as to use it also in private life situations are much more likely to be successful in integration – i.e. reach education beyond compulsory schooling, find a good job, build relationships with locals etc. - and less likely to get exposed to vulnerability on several spheres of life such as for example the labour market, education.




Figure 4.11. Relationship between language used in private life and risk of vulnerability

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Language seems to have a smaller influence on the chances of vulnerability than expected: 53% of TCN youth who speak the host country's language in private life and 61% of TCN immigrants who speak another language are in disadvantaged position in one or more dimensions of social integration. Comparing the role language between TCN and EU mobile youth we see very similar patterns. (for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 23.4$ ,  $p = .000$ ; for EU mobile:  $\chi(2) = 18.8$ ,  $p = .000$ )

*Summarizing this section we conclude that citizenship, proficiency of the language of host country as well as the time spent in the country of destination matter in terms of the chances of being in vulnerable conditions, but neither of these factors is decisive. Non-citizens of the host country, recent immigrants as well as those who use a language other than the host environment's in private life although are somewhat more vulnerable, but the relationship between these factors and the risk of vulnerability is far from being deterministic.*

The final section of this chapter discusses a few essential subjective characteristics that are at the core of subtle integration of immigrants, such as subjective wellbeing, interpersonal trust and institutional trust, and compares TCN immigrants with non-immigrant youth.

Subjective well-being SWB is “a person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life”, or put in a more simple form it is the individual evaluation of quality of life (QOL) (Diener, Lucas, & Oishi 2002). SWB is one of the most frequently used indicator of people’s evaluation of their situation that includes in addition to objective dimensions (such as housing, income, work, health) a number of subjective factors such as being content with life, happy and feeling included in the direct and broader community. The following figure demonstrates and compares subjective wellbeing<sup>80</sup> among third country national (TCN) immigrants and non-immigrants by their level of vulnerability.




Figure 4.12. Subjective wellbeing, immigrant background and risk of vulnerability

Source: authors’ computations based on European Social Survey data

The good news is that the vast majority of young people’s perception of the wellbeing is high irrespective of whether they are immigrants or natives. (Figure 4.12) Unsurprisingly, vulnerability, which is measured by disadvantaged position on various dimensions of social integration, influences the extent to which young people are content with their situation. The relationship between vulnerability, especially multi-dimensional vulnerability and subjective wellbeing is somewhat stronger among non-immigrants than among TCN youth. 41% of non-immigrants facing several parallel disadvantages and a third of TCN youth regard their wellbeing as average or below. (for TCN:  $\chi(4) = 136.3, p = .000$ ; for non-migrant:  $\chi(2) = 3621.4, p = .000$ )

Trust is another key concept in sociology, especially in the field of social integration. Trust is one of the most important factors enabling interpersonal relations, and as such it is considered as a lubricant of functioning societies. As a result of generalized (or interpersonal) trust, people are willing to interact, cooperate and thus is an important prerequisite of a smooth social functioning. (Sztompka 1999). Literature differentiates between two types of trust: generalized trust reflects an

<sup>80</sup> Subjective well-being includes evaluation of happiness and satisfaction with life, originally measured on a 0 to 10 scale. For easier interpretation the values were recoded into 3 categories. (low: 0 to 3, mid: 4 to 6, high: 7 to 10)

individual's estimate of the trustworthiness of the generalized anonymous other (Coleman, 1990), that is, how much s/he can trust others in the society, while institutional trust refers to the faith and confidence in fundamental public organizations, such as the government, the parliament, police, judicial system<sup>81</sup>. Evidently, trust is a key concept to social integration of immigrants, too. Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) and Dinesen (2012) studied the adaptation of first- and second-generation immigrants through the level of trust they developed toward state institutions and other people (i.e. institutional and generalized trust). They found that the level of trust among second-generation immigrants can be viewed as an indicator of immigrants' integration.

The next figure represents generalized trust of TCN immigrant and native youth in Europe by the level of vulnerability.




Figure 4.13. Generalized trust, vulnerability and migrant background

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

The interesting lessons the figure suggests is that while the level of trust correlates with vulnerability in the group of native youth, in the case of TCN immigrants such correlation does not exist. TCN immigrant youth has the same level of trust independently from the level of vulnerability they face. (Figure 4.13) This is good news, because interpersonal trust is a key prerequisite of cooperation and social integration. It seems that even for the most vulnerable TCN youth low trust is rarely an impediment. (for TCN:  $\chi(2) = 11.3, p = .023$ ; for non-migrant:  $\chi(2) = 811.0, p = .000$ )

There are two important findings: TCN immigrant youth trust institutions of the country significantly more than native youth. This finding is in accordance with other studies focusing on immigrant adults (Messing and Ságvári 2020, Diensen 2012). The other important message of Figure 4.13 is that while vulnerability matters in terms of the level non-immigrant youth trust in their country's institutions,

<sup>81</sup> Interpersonal trust is a composite index calculated from the three items in the ESS questionnaire measuring trust towards others<sup>81</sup>. Institutional trust summarizes measures on five individual items: the level of trust in the country's parliament, politicians, political parties, the legal system, and the police.

such relationship does not exist in the case of TCN youth. This is important again, because lower levels of trust in institutions would hamper social integration for them. But this does not seem to be the case. (for TCN:  $\chi(4) = 12.2$ ,  $p = .016$ ; for non-migrant:  $\chi(4) = 1082.1$ ,  $p = .000$ )




Figure 4.14 Institutional and personal trust, vulnerability and migrant background

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

*Concluding this section we may say, that subjective wellbeing of both native and TCN youth is high, and though being vulnerable on one or several dimensions of social integration decreases SWB to some extent, but compared to native this relationship is weaker among TCN youth. Trust towards others as well as trust in major societal institutions is high among TCN youth, in general and in contrast to non-immigrants it is not dependent on the level of vulnerability they experience.*

#### 4.4 Summary and chapter conclusions

In this chapter using individual (micro-) level data from the European Social Survey we focused on TCN immigrants below the age of 30 and checked the main factors that are likely to increase the chances of living in vulnerable conditions. A composite indicator was used signalling vulnerable conditions on four dimensions of social integration: labour market, education, health and social inclusion. The indicator has three values: (1) no vulnerable condition was detected along any of the four dimensions (2) the young person experiences vulnerability in one dimension (one-dimensional) (3) the young person experiences vulnerable conditions along two or more dimensions of social integration (multi-dimensional). Based on this complex indicator we could establish the following:

TCN immigrant youth is significantly more exposed to vulnerable conditions and especially to multiple vulnerabilities than young people with no immigrant background. Less than half of TCN immigrant youth does not live in vulnerable conditions, 37% face the risk of vulnerability in one of the four dimensions and 21% face vulnerable conditions along more dimensions of social integration. We also established that low income and low education, and the combination of these two are the most frequent reason for vulnerable conditions for both TCN and native youth. Poor health is rarely a

reason for vulnerability in this age group. Comparing countries in the EU we found that the host country environment affects the likelihood of vulnerable conditions for TCN immigrants differently: they are least likely to be exposed to vulnerability in Germany, Switzerland, Norway and the most likely in Austria, Portugal, Spain. The low number of TCN immigrant youth in the ESS sample does not allow to make statistically sound statements for Central-East European countries.

In the study we analysed various factors that may be associated with the likelihood of TCN immigrant youth to be in vulnerable conditions. We found that the region of origin matters a lot: Immigrants who have European descent (coming from countries of the former post-communist block and USSR) are the least likely to live in vulnerable condition while those from North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa and from the Middle East have the greatest chance to be disadvantaged along one or several dimensions of social integration. We found that discrimination is a very important element of vulnerability: over a fifth of TCN immigrant youth feel that they are being discriminated against but this share is 31% among young people who live in multiple vulnerable conditions. We can't draw a cause and effect relationship: is being discriminated against the cause for becoming more vulnerable; or contrarily, being vulnerable (especially facing disadvantages on one or several dimensions of life) is the reason for being more frequently discriminated. Being Muslim is an additional important factor adding to the likelihood of being in vulnerable conditions.

Concerning basic personal and family characteristics we found that – in contrast to expectations - gender and locality does not correlate with vulnerability, while parents' education as well as having a child on their own is a significant factor influencing chances of being in vulnerable conditions. As to conditions of migration all studied aspects – citizenship, the time spent since arriving in the host country, and language proficiency - seem to correlate with the chances of being in vulnerable and especially in multiply vulnerable conditions.

Looking at subtle, subjective characteristics of TCN immigrant youth and how this may be effected by vulnerable conditions we found that subjective wellbeing of both native and TCN youth is high, and though being vulnerable on one or several dimensions of social integration decreases subjective wellbeing to some extent, but compared to native this relationship is weaker among TCN youth. Trust towards others as well as trust in major societal institutions is high among TCN youth, in general and in contrast to non-immigrants it is not dependent on the level of vulnerability they experience.

## 5 Mainstream society's attitudes towards immigrants in a European comparison.

Vera Messing and Bence Ságvári (CEU)

### 5.1 Introduction, data, indicators

In the following chapter we will describe mainstream society's attitudes towards immigrants in Europe. As described in MIMY proposal we will do so, because the perception of the European citizens about migrants and migration is an important factor influencing the degree to which migrants get a chance to integrate into the receiving community. Thus, we presume that mainstream society's attitudes towards immigrants - whether they are more accepting of immigrants to settle and cohabit or hostile to this group - is an important factor of the opportunity structure for immigrants' social integration. Also, integration is a two way and constantly occurring process 'as the young migrant in vulnerable conditions tries to adjust to or integrate into new environments, not only does he/she undergo change, but the social and institutional environment and its immanent practices, which the young migrant seeks to adjust to, are constantly transforming as a result of practices, and while transforming have a feedback effect on the individual.' (Skrobanek 2020: 17)

For the purpose of this analysis we will use micro (individual-) level data offered by the European Social Survey (ESS) of the last survey round (R9) that was conducted in 2018/2019. This data set includes responses of 47 thousand people in 27 countries across Europe. The ESS 9<sup>th</sup> survey round was fielded in the vast majority of EU member states (exceptions are Luxemburg, Romania, Malta, Greece and Denmark), Switzerland, Norway and several countries from the west Balkan that are significant in terms of migration processes in Europe.

In the second part of this chapter we will offer a time-series comparison of attitudes for which we included those 16 countries, which were included in all survey rounds, thus provide bi-yearly data since 2002. These include 6 of the MIMY partner countries: Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the UK while Italy participated in 5 rounds (2002, 2004, 2012, 2016 and 2018). For these countries time series analysis will also be presented.

#### Indicators

Based on ESS data two indicators will be used reflecting the behavioural and cognitive elements of attitudes: referring to the ABC model of attitudes (Van den Berg et al 2006, Eagly and Chaiken 1998).<sup>82</sup> These correspond with indexes used in the dataset compiled for MIMY's deliverable D2.1. (ADem3.1 and Perception index - ADem3.2)<sup>83</sup>.

**The behavioural component** will be indicated by the *Rejection Index (RI)* which denotes the share of those who would *reject any immigrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe* without consideration.<sup>84</sup> This is a one dimensional indicator, however, we argue that by using only the extreme response to migration as a single indicator we are able to capture unequivocal attitudes.

<sup>82</sup> Since there are no questions in the ESS that could be used to measure the affective component, our analysis is focusing only two components of the attitudes.

<sup>83</sup> Roman, M et al. (2020) D2.1. Macro-data inventory.

<sup>84</sup> This index is constructed from a single question: "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?" (1: Allow many to come and live here; 2: Allow some; 3: Allow a few; 4: Allow none; 8: Don't know) We recoded responses into a binary variable at individual level, summarizing those answering 'allow none' versus all other responses.

**The cognitive component** reflects the perception of the consequences of migration on material life. Three items are compiled to one indicator, referred to in this chapter as Perception Index (PI) which measures the impact of migration on the economy<sup>85</sup>, on culture<sup>86</sup> and generally<sup>87</sup> as perceived by individual respondents. The *Perception Index (PI)* ranges from 0 to 100 and was constructed as follows: the 0 to 10 scale responses given to each of the three questions were summed up and converted into a 0-100 scale in order to be harmonized and thus comparable with the values of the Rejection Index.

For explaining differences in the perception of migration we also used several explanatory variables from the ESS that – based on literature – are expected to correlate with attitudes: these include basic demography, status, and political party preferences.

Another question to be clarified in the section on data and methods concerns the conceptualization of migrants. The term ‘migrant’ is well defined in legal and policy contexts, still it is used in many senses, especially in the non-scholarly public discourse. Questions which measure the cognitive element of attitudes in the survey apply the broadest possible concept of immigrant when referring to “*people coming to live here from other countries*”. The question measuring the behavioral element of attitudes is more specific as it asks about “*people from the poorer countries outside Europe*”. By and large this question refers to the population of TCN immigrants, which is also the focus of MIMY project.

## 5.2 Attitudes towards immigrant in European countries: a snapshot of Europe in 2018/19

The Figure 5.1 shows the cognitive and behavioural elements of attitudes towards immigrants in 27 countries across Europe in 2018/19 (9th round of the ESS).

The perception of the consequences of immigration on the receiving societies’ economy, culture and welfare is more or less neutral; the combined index is 52 on a European average on a 1-100 scale. On average, 17% of Europeans (based on only design weight applied to the dataset) would reject any immigrant arriving from poorer countries outside Europe to settle in their countries.<sup>88</sup>

There are, however, significant and important differences in attitudes towards immigrants across countries of Europe. While differences in the perception of the consequences of migration on the economy, culture and welfare system of the receiving societies remain moderate (fluctuate between 40 in HU and 67 in Sweden) the rejection of immigrants shows much larger variations.

Mainly people in post-communist East European countries (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia) and in Cyprus perceive the consequences of migration negatively (PI is below 45), while people in the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Germany, UK, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal evaluate that migration has more positive than negative consequences for their societies and economies (PI is over 55). It is important to note, that countries with very little immigrant population and thus direct experience with immigrants perceive the consequences of migration most negatively, while in countries which are the most popular destination countries, and thus have a large share of immigrant

<sup>85</sup> *Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?*

<sup>86</sup> *“Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”*

<sup>87</sup> *“Is your country made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”*

<sup>88</sup> When applying both design and population weight – i.e. allowing for the real population of each country in the dataset – the proportion changes to 13%.



Among Western European countries there is a handful, where only a negligible share of the population considers that none of the TCN immigrants should settle (Nordic countries, Portugal, Germany and Switzerland) and there are some, in which a visible minority (10-21% of the population) thinks this way (Austria, Italy, France). Similarly, not all countries are equally hostile in Eastern Europe, there are significant differences within countries of the region: Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia being the most hostile and northern countries (Poland, Lithuania) as well as ex-Yugoslav countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro) are significantly more open to immigrants. This is a new and somewhat unexpected finding: based on the modern history of the West Balkan, the long-term ethnic hostility and the generally lower level of trust and wellbeing that would predict higher levels of anti-migrant hostility (see Messing and Ságvári 2018), we expected more negative attitudes towards migration in this region. There are six countries that can be identified as in-betweeners in Europe: attitudes in Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia and Croatia, which are significantly more positive towards immigrants than the average of post-communist countries, while people in Austria and Italy think more negatively of immigration and immigrants than people in Western Europe do, in general.

Another important finding that we would like to point out is the relationship between the perception of the consequences of migration and the rejection of immigrants that is the relationship between the cognitive and behavioural elements of attitudes.

Looking at Figure 5.1 we can see that countries where people have – on average – very similar perceptions about the consequences of migration may evaluate whether to allow TCN immigrants to settle in their countries very differently. For example, people in Portugal, Ireland and Sweden assess the consequences of immigration very similarly (PI is 61, 62 and 63 respectively). In Ireland every tenth person is on the opinion that none of the TCN immigrants should be allowed to come and settle in their country while this share is 4% in Portugal and 3% in Sweden. Also, people in Belgium and Latvia perceive the consequences of migration on their societies very similarly (PI=55), still, in Latvia almost a third of the population would reject TCN migrants to settle in their county while in Belgium this share is only 8%. And finally, in countries with the most extreme anti-migrant attitudes we can trace similar differences. In Hungary and Slovakia the PI is 37 and 38, but the rejection of immigrants is almost double in Hungary (57%) than in Slovakia (37%). In countries of post-communist Eastern Europe have a somewhat more negative perception about economic, societal and cultural consequences of migration than in old EU member states, but these are turned into upfront rejection even more easily than in long-term democracies of Western Europe. While the scope of this analysis does not allow for the investigation of the reasons behind these differences, still – based on scholarly knowledge – we suggest that they have to do with a combination of several factors: migration in Eastern Europe is minor and people have very little personal experience of immigrants and the consequences of migration to their country (Messing and Ságvári 2018) The media coverage, which represents as well as sets political and public discourse can have considerable effects on public attitudes toward immigration and the perceived impact of immigration (Chauzy and Appave, 2014). In countries where somewhat negative perception of migration is turned into a high level of rejection are usually those where migration is high on the agenda of dominant political parties that are very explicitly hostile to immigrants.

### 5.3 Focus on MIMY partner countries

As mentioned in the introduction, out of nine MIMY partner countries six – Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the UK - participated in all survey rounds, while Italy in four rounds (2002, 2010, 2016, 2018) of the European Social Survey, and thus offer data suitable for time series analysis of the changes of attitudes since 2002. The following Figure shows the changes in the perception and rejection indexes.




Figure 5.2. Changes of cognitive attitudes: the perception of consequences of migration on locals (2002-2018)

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

The perception of the consequences on migration has been favourable and very stable in Sweden across the past 16 years. In other countries we see more fluctuation over one and a half decade. Poland shows an inverse U shape with rather neutral assessment of the consequences of migration in the first half of the 2000s and an increase of more positive attitudes between 2006 and 2012. By 2014 attitudes became neutral again. In Norway and Germany we see a trend of attitudes changing towards more positive ones moderately but steadily during this time period. In the UK and Hungary attitudes towards immigrants have been rather stable (and slightly negative) until 2012. After 2012 they have diverted significantly: in the UK towards a visibly more positive assessment of the consequences of migration, while in Hungary contrarily, towards negative perception of migration. For Italy we don't have trends but see very neutral attitudes in 2002 and ten years later, changing towards slightly negative perception of the consequences of immigration in 2016 and 2018.

The rejection index, namely the share of those respondents who would reject any TCN immigrant to come and settle in their country show similar trends as the PI but also the division between MIMY partner countries more sharply. In Sweden and in Norway the RI has been stable and very low with only a few percent of its population rejecting TCN migrants' settling in the country without any further consideration. In Poland this was the case till 2012, but after this date the rejection of immigrants has started to surge and is now 20%. We observe a particular surge after 2015 when the right-wing Law and Justice government came into power on a clear anti-immigration and anti-refugee ticket inciting fear and hatred against migrants in the peak of the so called 'refugee crisis' of 2015. "The new anti-immigration discourses have been enacted in Poland's public sphere by the right-wing populist party PiS (Law and Justice). Its discourse in offline and online media has drawn on discursive patterns including Islamophobia, Euro-scepticism, anti-internationalism, and historical patterns and templates of discrimination such as anti-Semitism." (Kryzanowski 2018: 76) In a society, where immigration is minor and lacking from the political discourse for decades, a politically inspired, hostile agenda setting on the issue may increase anti-immigrant sentiments significantly (see also the case of Hungary).




Figure 5.3. Changes of attitudes (behavioural): rejection of TCN immigrants (2002-2018)

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

In the UK we see an opposite trend to Poland: relatively high and increasing rejection of immigrants till 2014 (15-22%) and a sharp decrease thereafter (10% and below). Many argued that the populist voices around the Brexit saga have contributed to the increase of anti-immigrant attitudes in the UK, and this is how we can explain the high level of RI in the UK (in comparison to long term democracies in Western Europe) till 2016 (Goodwin & Milazzo 2017, Dennison & Geddes 2018). Extremely negative media portrayal of migrants, especially those arriving from post-communist EU member states such as Romania, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria was one of the factors that served as a trigger for the outcome of 52 per cent of the UK voting to leave the EU in 2016. In accordance with Competition Theory (Levine and Campbell 1972) that postulates that negative attitudes are essentially rooted in perceived competition for scarce goods and anti-immigrant attitudes rise in times of scarcity, the 2008 economic crisis and following recession and austerity measures may have played a role in increasing anti-migrants sentiments, too. We are not sure how to interpret the explicit and strong decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes since 2016 but economic recovery after the 2008 crisis may have played a role as well as some kind of post-Brexit sobering and distancing from accusations of xenophobia related to Brexit voters among both Leavers and Remainers. (Schwartz et al 2020)

In Germany the rejection of immigrants was rather moderate in 2002 (9%) but doubled within 2 years, by 2004. We suspect several intersecting factors that might explain this increase. On the one hand increasing economic problems (the rising indebtedness of the state) and peaking unemployment rates in the first half of the 2000s. On the other hand, this time period was characterized by a surge in popularity of the nationalistic far-right NPD party which was covered extensively by the media. Also, uncertainties about the management of migration seemed to play a

role, though these were settled by the Immigration Act, which entered into force in January 2005<sup>89</sup>. Also, in the early 2000s the SPD –Green Party coalition initiated more progressive migration policy that might have influenced public attitudes. There was a shift in public and political debate on demographic decline creating a rationale for a more open migration policy to satisfy labour market demands. Since then there has been a constantly increasing trend towards the acceptance of immigrants in Germany and note-worthily even the arrival and integration of over a million refugees in Germany in 2015 and 2016, placing burdens upon Germany’s politics, institutions and society, has not altered this trend.

Hungary is a complete outlier to European trends in terms of attitudes towards immigrants: with its anyway high refusal rates since the start of measurement it rocketed in 2014. We must say, that with 57% of the population rejecting migrants unconditionally, Hungary is even more hostile to migrants than non-EU countries, such as Russia, the Ukraine, Turkey or Israel, where the category of “migrants from poorer countries, outside Europe” has probably a different and quite acute meaning. The hostile attitudes towards migrants in Hungary may be attributed to several intersecting factors: low number of migrants and consequently a lack of contact, personal experience and knowledge about migrants, together with the generally low levels of trust and social cohesion which characterise Hungarian society. A society in such a state has proved an extremely fertile terrain for the manipulative, anti-migrant propaganda that the Hungarian government put into action in early 2015 and has kept operating since then. This propaganda includes elements of false public consultation with manipulative questions supporting widespread negative beliefs, multiple and extensive publicity campaigns explicitly raising fear of migrants, and biased, extremely intense and hostile government discourse and media coverage of migrants by pro-government media. By now (as of 2019) the government has succeeded in presenting migrants as the preeminent threat to the Hungarian nation, and convinced a large share of the population that rejecting migrants and migration in general is not only morally acceptable but also a patriotic and advantageous act. (Cantat and Rajajam 2018, Bernáth and Messing 2015 and 2016; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017)

The next Figure shows attitudes towards immigrants in MIMY partner countries across some of the key socio-demographic groups such as gender, age, education, residence, subjective income and labour market status:

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<sup>89</sup> The law (The Immigration Act entered into force on January 1, 2005.) allows highly qualified non-EU-workers such as scientists or top-level managers to obtain a residence permit of unlimited duration at the outset. (<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germany-immigration-transition>)




Figure 5.4. Attitudes towards immigrants by basic socio-economic factors

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

The Figure shows again the immense differences in attitudes towards immigrants across MIMY partner countries. The only variable that seems to influence attitudes towards immigrants in all of

MIMY partner countries is subjective income. In all of the studied countries with the increase of income and existential stability goes along with less hostile attitudes towards immigrants. Contrarily, gender does not make a difference in any of the countries: men and women seem to have rather similar attitudes. Other basic socio-demographic features matter to a different extent and in different ways in the seven countries for which ESS has data.

In countries where rejection of immigrants is minor basic socio-demographic factors make little differences in how people think about immigrants. In Norway and Sweden the entire population irrespective of gender, age, social status, education, labour market status is positive and inclusive. In Germany, where people, on average, have also fairly positive attitudes towards immigrants, some of the socio-demographic factors make a difference: age, for example: the older people think more negatively about immigrants than youth. Also, labour market status matters: rejection among those who are in paid work or in education is insignificant while among the unemployed and retired people rejection is significantly more prevalent. However, it is the subjective income that seems to have the largest influence on attitudes among Germans. A fifth of those who have existential problems on a daily basis are hostile to immigrant while only ever twentieth German who lives in existential safety rejects immigrant. In Hungary hostility towards immigrants is rather widespread among all socio-demographic groups. With a few exceptions -14-19 year old, people with tertiary education, people in the highest groups of subjective income and those who are still in education – the rejection index is over 50 in all groups. In Italy, Poland and the UK socio-demographic factors have a relatively large influence on attitudes: age seems to matter in terms of how people think of immigration, the older people are, the more of them they reject immigrants. Also education has a similar influence: the higher educational credential one has the more positively s/he thinks about immigrants. Those who have employment or study seem to be more accepting of immigrants than unemployed and economically inactive people. And residence has a little effect: people living in rural areas tend to be more hostile to immigrants compared to those living in urban areas.

And finally, we analysed how political party preferences correlate with attitudes towards migrants. Figure 5 shows the results: The first important observation we can make is that in different countries party preferences have a different influence on anti-migrant attitudes. While in Hungary, Poland rejection of immigrants is not very much dependent on party preferences, in old EU member states they are.




Figure 5.5. Attitudes towards immigrants by party preferences (2018/19)

Source: authors' computations based on European Social Survey data

Another important finding to make is that although in all countries supporters of right wing populist parties express more negative attitudes towards immigrants than others, still there are significant differences in the relationship between support of political parties and attitudes. In Germany and in Sweden it is the right wing populist that gather that part of the population which is hostile to immigrants, while rejection is minor among supporters of all other political parties. In Italy a similar pattern can be seen with the difference, that supporters of non-populist parties are somewhat more critical about migration than in Germany or in Sweden. Also, in the UK, there is one party – the Independence Party – which seems to be a hub for those who feel negatively about immigrants and migration, in general. On the contrary, in Hungary and in Poland party preference makes much less difference in the levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Although in these countries supporters of right wing populist parties have the most negative attitudes towards immigrant, but supporters of other parties are not that different in this respect. Rejection of immigrants is as high as 40-50% even supporters of left wing parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party, Democratic Coalition. Thus, we may establish that anti-immigrant attitudes are not only widespread in Hungary but seem to form a political agreement stretching from the extreme right to the left. Poland is a different case in its generally more positive attitudes towards immigrants, but the weak relationship between party preference and attitudes towards migrants hold here too.

## 5.4 Summary and chapter conclusion

In this chapter we aimed to provide an overview of mainstream society's attitudes towards immigrants. We consider that the host country's circumstances are a very important element of immigrant's integration and while institutional environment – labour market, education, housing – is a key to the smooth integration, subtle and subjective elements, such as how natives think about immigrants, how they perceive their roles and attitudes they reveal towards immigrants is a very significant element concerning the process and chances of integration.

In the analysis we used the largest and most reliable European comparative data set, the European Social Survey that allows for geographical as well as time series comparison. For a snapshot of attitudes we used the most recent data from 2018/19 including 27 countries in Europe, while looking at the changes of attitudes in the past almost two decades we zoomed into seven of the MIMY partner countries: Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the UK while Italy participated in 5 rounds (2002, 2004, 2012, 2016 and 2018). Two indicators served to assess attitudes: Perception Index indicates the cognitive element of attitudes (i.e. reflects mainstream society's perceptions about the consequences of migration on their societies and economies), while the Rejection Index represents the behavioural element of attitudes (i.e. denotes the share of those who reject any TCN immigrant to settle in their country). We established that by and large, attitudes towards immigrants in Europe are neutral, people see as much advantages as disadvantages of migration; on average 17% of Europeans reject the settling of new TCN immigrants in their countries. However there are very significant differences within Europe: people in post-communist East European countries, where immigrant population is insignificant (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia) and in Cyprus perceive the consequences of migration negatively and are also the most hostile to newcomers. Populations of the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Germany, UK, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal evaluate that migration has more positive than negative consequences for their societies and economies and also are more welcoming to TCN immigrants. The data reveal that although there is a clear East-West divide in both the perception of the consequences of immigrants as well as their rejection, still nor the 'West' neither the 'East' is homogeneous in the evaluation of immigration and its consequences: in Western Europe there are countries where only a negligible share of the population considers that none of the TCN immigrants should settle, and these include MIMY partner countries: Germany, Norway, Sweden, while there are countries where larger minority (10-21%) thinks this way. Also, differences in attitudes are significant in Eastern Europe: Hungary, Czechia and

Slovakia being the most hostile and northern countries (Poland, Lithuania) as well as ex-Yugoslav countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro) are significantly more open to immigrants.

Zooming into MIMY partner countries we found that in Sweden attitudes have been very favourable and stable ever since ESS measured them. However, some studies suggest, that attitudes towards refugees are somewhat different and more negative (reference). In Norway and Germany we see a trend of attitudes changing towards more positive ones moderately but steadily during this time period, while in Poland attitudes have been, with some fluctuation rather neutral. In the UK and Hungary attitudes towards immigrants have been rather stable (and slightly negative) until 2012. After 2012 they have diverted significantly: in the UK towards a visibly more positive assessment of the consequences of migration, while in Hungary contrarily, towards negative perception of migration. Concerning the behavioural element of attitude we see Hungary as an utmost outlier with an extremely large share (almost two thirds) of its population rejecting any TCN immigrant to settle in Hungary. The sharp increasing trend in rejection started in 2012. The same process is true for Poland, but with much lower shares of rejection. In other MIMY countries, however, we see a stabilizing and decreasing trend of hostility, and this is especially significant in the UK.

## 6 Conclusions

*Vera Messing (CEU) and Monica Roman (ASE)*

In this report we aimed to provide an overview of migration processes in Europe using a description of the most important dimensions of integration, with a special focus on young immigrants aged between 18 and 29, who arrived from third countries from outside the EU. To this end we used macro-level statistical data, primarily from EUROSTAT sources and from sources that were compiled in the first deliverable of this work package (Roman et al., 2020). In the second part of the report with the help of European comparative individual (micro) level data we aimed to identify various elements of young TCN immigrants living in vulnerable conditions and to compare their socio-demographic, migration characteristics to those who are not in a vulnerable position, as well as to non-immigrants. In the final chapter of the report, we zoom out to the host environment and analyse individual level data about attitudes towards immigrants by the mainstream society.

The macro data analysis revealed that over 17 million immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe lived in the EU28 countries, the main destination countries being the UK, France, Italy, and Germany, with over 12% of their population being TCN immigrants. Post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, such as Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Bulgaria, are the least preferred destinations, as well as Iceland, Malta, Luxembourg, with less than 1% of their population being TCN immigrants. Obviously, the different weighting of immigrants in a country poses different challenges and levels of pressure on institutions in terms of immigrant integration. In the period 2010-2018, the top five destination countries in the EU were Germany, Spain, Italy, France and the UK. Zooming in to refugees and asylum seekers, a key group for the MIMY research project, we notice that in the 2010-2018 asylum applications their numbers have more than doubled in the EU28 countries, with a peak in the 2015-2016 period, referred to as the 'refugee crisis'. In 2015 more than half of the asylum seekers registered in Germany (350 thousand), but Hungary also registered over 170 thousand asylum applications in that year, while in Italy a longer curve of increasing asylum applications were registered in the period of 2015-2017. The numbers have decreased significantly by 2018 in all countries, Germany remaining the largest taker of refugees. There are two groups of highly vulnerable immigrants included in this report through macro statistical data: unaccompanied minors and stateless immigrants. The numbers are significantly smaller: in 2009 over 11 thousand unaccompanied minors were registered in EU-27

countries, with a majority of boys. Before the 2015 inflow of refugees from war hit areas of the Middle East, the largest destination countries were Sweden, Germany and the UK, whereas in 2015 and after, Germany, Italy and Austria were the destination countries with the highest number of refugees. The numbers increased very significantly reaching the peak of 100 thousand in 2015 and decreasing steadily by 2019. While there are quite reliable statistics on unaccompanied minors, the number of stateless immigrants is more an estimation. However, their numbers are rather low: there were 1617 stateless people in EU statistics in 2018 and a further approximately 7000 with unknown citizenship. Stateless people are present in Germany, Sweden and Norway of the MIMY consortium countries, while in other countries there are no or just a few (below 100). Acquisition of citizenship and naturalization rate are important indicators of immigrants' integration. The overall acquisition of citizenship dropped since 2013 and 13% of youth (age-group 18-29) acquire citizenship in the EU, primarily in the top destination countries of the EU (Germany, UK, Sweden, France, Italy, Spain).

Using macro-statistical data, this report described integration of young TCN immigrants in the EU along the dimensions of the Zaragoza declaration: labour market, education, social inclusion and health. Concerning labour market indicators we see that, although there is an increasing trend in employment and activity rates among young TCN immigrant population (from 38% to 45%), the rates are still lower among immigrant youth. There are significant differences between EU member states: generally, in northern countries TCN immigrants are doing worse compared to natives, while in Eastern Europe this relationship twists. Also, the gender gap within the TCN immigrant youth population is significantly larger than among native youth. We also showed that TCN immigrants are generally more exposed to schemes offering less stability and more precarious forms of employment (part time and temporary employment) or to unemployment.

As to education, TCN immigrant youth is more vulnerable than their native peers: only half of them completes secondary education (a level that is valued by labour market actors) and the gender gap is significant, too. About a quarter of young immigrant women are neither in education nor in employment. Early leaving is also more frequent in this population group than among natives: one in five TCN youth (aged 18-24) leaves education early, before reaching secondary diploma, representing twice more than natives in this age group.

It is not a great surprise that social inclusion indicators show a similar pattern: a gap between TCN immigrant and native youth, with the former being in a more vulnerable position, exposed to the risk of poverty, to a large extent. Comparing countries, it becomes evident that in some countries poverty indicators are low for both groups (Germany, Sweden, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries), in others poverty is widespread among both groups, but affecting TCN immigrants to a greater extent (Greece, Cyprus, Spain), and there are countries where poverty among natives is not widespread but TCNs are greatly affected (Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and even Norway). We may suspect that in these countries TCN immigrants can profit less from social policy measures than natives. This is certainly a potential focus for the MIMY project.

In the third chapter we analysed dimensions of vulnerability using micro-level data. It has been established that TCN immigrant youth is significantly more exposed to vulnerable conditions and especially to multiple vulnerabilities than young people with no immigrant background. Less than half of TCN immigrant youth does not live in vulnerable conditions, 37% face the risk of vulnerability in one of the four dimensions and 21% face vulnerable conditions along more dimensions of social integration. Low income and low education, and the combination of these two are the most frequent reasons for vulnerable conditions for both TCN and native youth, while poor health is rarely a reason for vulnerability in this age group. Comparing countries in the EU, we found that the host country environment affects the likelihood of vulnerable conditions for TCN immigrants differently: they are least likely to be exposed to vulnerability in Germany, Switzerland, Norway and the most likely in Austria, Portugal, and Spain. Analysing various factors that may be correlated with the likelihood of TCN immigrant youth to be in vulnerable conditions we found that the region of origin matters a lot: Immigrants who have European descent (coming from countries of the former post-communist block

and USSR) are the least likely to live in vulnerable conditions, while those from North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and from the Middle East have the greatest chance to be disadvantaged along one or several dimensions of social integration. In addition, vulnerability is correlated with perceived discrimination, Muslim faith, family background (poor education of parents) and present family conditions. Having children increases the likelihood of being vulnerable. As to conditions of migration, all studied aspects – citizenship, the time spent since arrival in the host country, and language proficiency - seem to correlate with the chances of being in vulnerable conditions and especially in conditions with multiple vulnerabilities.

The final chapter provided an overview of mainstream society's attitudes towards immigrants in the host country's environment, including attitudes and thoughts of the mainstream population about immigrants, as very important conditions of integration. It has been established that by and large, attitudes towards immigrants in Europe are neutral, people see as many advantages as disadvantages to migration; on average 17% of Europeans reject the settling of new TCN immigrants in their countries. However, there are very significant differences within Europe: people in post-communist East European countries, where immigrant population's presence is insignificant (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia) and in Cyprus, perceive the consequences of migration negatively and are also the most hostile to newcomers. Populations of the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Germany, UK, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal consider that migration has more positive than negative consequences for their societies and economies and are also more welcoming to TCN immigrants. The data reveal that although there is a clear East-West divide in both the perception of the consequences of immigrants as well as their rejection, still, neither the 'West' nor the 'East' is homogeneous in the evaluation of immigration and its consequences: in Western Europe there are countries where only a negligible share of the population considers that none of the TCN immigrants should settle, and these include MIMY partner countries: Germany, Norway, Sweden, while there are countries where a larger minority (10-21%) thinks this way. Also, differences in attitudes are significant in Eastern Europe: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia being the most hostile, while northern countries (Poland, Lithuania) as well as ex-Yugoslav countries are significantly less hostile to immigrants.

The European landscape seems to be extremely diverse in terms of the dimensions and trends of the flows of migrants in vulnerable conditions: a small group of countries (Germany, Spain, UK) were targeted, while eastern European countries were the least preferred. However, in all of the European countries there are indicators that suggest a lack of integration on one or several dimensions, as confirmed by both micro and macro analysis. Looking closer to the report's results may be helpful in understanding the differences between European countries and also in designing integration policies adapted to the national contexts.

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## 8 Annexes

### 8.1 Table A1. Synthesis and definitions of indicators used in Section 3.1 Labour market integration

Data reported in table below is for EU28, 2018.

Indicator	Non-EU28 Born	Native-born	Gap
Activity rate, 15 – 29 years, is defined as the percentage of the population in a given age group who are economically active. According to the definitions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) people are classified as employed, unemployed and economically inactive for labour market statistics. The economically active population (also called labour force) is the sum of employed and unemployed persons. Inactive persons are those who, during the reference week, were neither employed nor unemployed.	55.7%	56.2%	-0.5 p
Employment rate, 15 – 29 years, is the percentage of employed persons to the comparable total population.	45.4%	49.8%	-4.4 p
Unemployment rates, 15 – 29 years, represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed.	18.5%	11.5%	7 p
Temporary employees, 15 – 29 years as a percentage of the total number of employees. A job may be considered temporary if employer and employee agree that its end is determined by objective conditions such as a specific date, the completion of a task or the return of another employee who has been temporarily replaced (usually stated in a work contract of limited duration). Typical cases are: (a) persons with seasonal employment; (b) persons engaged by an agency or employment exchange and hired to a third party to perform a specific task (unless there is a written work contract of unlimited duration); (c) persons with specific training contracts.	38.5%	31.9%	6.6 p
Part-time employment, 15 – 29 years, represents employees who work part-time as a percentage of total employment.	29%	23%	6 p
Newly employed rate, 15 – 24 years, measures the share of people in the current job for 12 months or less, in total employment.	57.2%	47.1%	10.1 p

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

## 8.2 Table A2. Synthesis and definitions of indicators used in Section 3.2. Education

Data reported in table below is for EU28, 2018.

Indicator	Non-EU28 Born	Native-born	Gap
Population by educational attainment level, 15 – 24 years, <b>presents</b> data on the highest level of education successfully completed by the individuals of a given population. The classification of educational activities is based on the <a href="#">International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)</a> . Data until 2013 are classified according to <a href="#">ISCED 1997</a> and data as from 2014 according to <a href="#">ISCED 2011</a> (coding of educational attainment).			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education: this aggregate refers to levels 0, 1 and 2 of the ISCED 2011</li> </ul>	50%	43.9%	6.1 p
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education: this aggregate corresponds to ISCED 2011 levels 3 and 4 (online code ED3_4).</li> </ul>	39.2%	46.5%	-7.3 p
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tertiary education: this aggregate covers ISCED 2011 levels 5, 6, 7 and 8 (short-cycle tertiary education, bachelor's or equivalent level, master's or equivalent level, doctoral or equivalent level, online code ED5-8 'tertiary education').</li> </ul>	10.8%	9.6%	1.2 p
NEET rates, 15 – 29 years. The indicator on young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) corresponds to the percentage of the population of a given age group and sex who is not employed and not involved in further education or training.	21.5%	12.1%	9.4 p
Early leavers from education and training - denotes the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 having attained at most lower secondary education and not being involved in further education or training.	20.7%	9.5%	11.2 p
Participation in education and training, 18 – 24 years, is a measure of lifelong learning. The participation rate in education and training covers participation in formal and non-formal education and training.	55.8%	58.9%	-3.1 p

*Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data*

### 8.3 Table A3. Synthesis and definitions of indicators used in Section 3.3. Social Inclusion.

Data reported in the table below is for EU28, 2018.


Indicator	Non-EU28 Born	Native-born	Gap
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 16 – 29 years – the indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are: at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators.	44.2%	24.7%	19.5 p
At-risk-of-poverty rate, 16 – 29 years – the share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers).	37.4%	19%	18.4 p
In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate, 16 – 29 years refers to the share of individuals who are classified as employed according to their most frequent activity status and are at risk of poverty. <sup>90</sup>	24.7%	8.8%	15.9 p
Severe material deprivation rate, 16 - 29 years – the share of people whose living conditions are constrained by a lack of resources and experience at least 4 out of the 9 following deprivation items: cannot afford 1) to pay rent/mortgage or utility bills on time, 2) to keep home adequately warm, 3) to face unexpected expenses, 4) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, 5) a one week holiday away from home, 6) a car, 7) a washing machine, 8) a colour TV, or 9) a telephone (including mobile phone).	12.5%	6.1%	6.4 p
People living in households with very low work intensity, 16 – 29 years – the share of people living in households with very low work intensity. These are households where on average the individuals work 20% or less of their total work potential during the past year.	13.6%	9.5%	4.1 p
Overcrowding rate, 16 – 29 years – percentage of the population living in an overcrowded household (a household that does not have at its disposal a minimum of rooms)	35.9%	21.9%	14 p
Housing cost overburden rate, 16 – 29 years – percentage of the population living in a household where total housing costs (net of housing allowances) represent more than 40% of the total disposable household income (net of housing allowances).	23.8%	11.2%	12.6 p

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

<sup>90</sup> Data in the table for this indicator is for 2017, as it was not yet available for 2018.

### 8.4 Additional figures supporting Chapter 3.


Fig. 8.4.1 Activity rate (%), 15 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>91</sup>, UK and Norway, 2018.



Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

<sup>91</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia.


Fig. 8.4.2 Employment rate (%), 15 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>92</sup>, the UK and Norway, 2018.



Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

<sup>92</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia.


Fig. 8.4.3 Part-time employment rate (%), 15 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>93</sup>, UK and Norway, 2018.



Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

<sup>93</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

Fig. 8.4.4 Newly employed (%), 15 – 24 years, EU countries<sup>94</sup>, the UK and Norway, 2018



Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

<sup>94</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia


Fig. 8.4.5 Employment rates of young people not in education or training (15 – 34 years) born outside the EU, EU countries<sup>95</sup>, UK and Norway, 2018

Country	All education levels	Tertiary education
Austria	68.40	69.00
Belgium	60.00	71.60
Croatia	78.90	76.40
Cyprus	73.50	69.40
Czechia	69.20	66.00
Denmark	75.20	79.10
Estonia	76.80	81.90
Finland	57.50	72.40
France	54.20	67.90
Germany	64.70	76.60
Greece	52.70	61.00
Hungary	80.00	91.90
Ireland	72.80	77.20
Italy	56.70	59.60
Latvia	87.10	98.00
Lithuania	88.10	97.60
Luxembourg	68.90	76.10
Malta	83.80	96.60
Netherlands	70.30	87.70
Norway	73.70	89.80
Poland	77.00	80.20
Portugal	78.30	80.30
Slovenia	71.00	70.50
Spain	61.70	75.10
Sweden	72.60	81.30
United Kingdom	72.00	79.20

Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data


<sup>95</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia.

Fig. 8.4.6 Population by educational attainment level, 15 – 24Y (%) born outside EU and native-born, EU28 level, 2010 – 2018.




Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

Fig. 8.4.7 Early – leavers from education, 18-24 years, born outside EU and native-born, EU28 average level, period 2010 – 2018




Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

Fig. 8.4.8 Early leavers from education (%), 18 – 24 Years, born outside EU and native-born, part of EU countries, 2018




Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

Fig. 8.4.9 Participation rate in education (%), 18 – 24 years, born outside EU and native-born, EU28 level, 2010 – 2018.




Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

Fig. 8.4.10 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%), 16 – 29 Y, EU28, 2010 – 2018



Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

Fig. 8.4.11 Housing cost overburden rate, 16 – 29 years, EU countries<sup>96</sup>, the UK and Norway, 2018.



Source: authors' compilation based on Eurostat data

<sup>96</sup> Data for young people born outside the EU not available for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia; for Poland data available only for 2019 (low reliability).